- Standing Committee A

[Mr. Roger Gale in the Chair]

National Lottery Bill

Roger Gale: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I believe that Mr. Cook has already given you permission to remove your jackets if you wish to do so. You have my permission also to make yourselves tolerably comfortable.

Clause 7 - National Lottery Distribution Fund: apportionment

Amendment made: No. 4, in clause 7, page 4, line 35, leave out ‘or’ and insert—
‘(da)any of the Channel Islands, or’.—[Mr. Caborn.]

Hugo Swire: I beg to move amendment No. 29, in clause 7, page 4, line 38, at end insert—
‘(3BA)At least three months before making an order under subsection (3A) the Secretary of State shall—
(a)give public notice of the proposed order, on his website and by other means,
(b)invite representations to be made to him, and
(c)consider those representations when making or not making the order, with or without modifications.
(3BB)The Secretary of State shall publish the representations and consultation responses received and give his reasons for making the order at the time of making the order.’.
I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Gale. The Committee started at a cracking pace this morning. I am not sure that we are making the progress that we should, but we are doing our level best. I am sure that you will both be indulgent and keep us in order.

Roger Gale: Order. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be aware that I am always fair but never indulgent.

Hugo Swire: I was trying it on, but clearly you will not be indulgent, Mr. Gale.
Without further ado, I shall proceed to amendment No. 29, which concerns the question of public consultation. We debated the subject of consultation by the Department earlier today, and it is something to which I would like to return in my concluding remarks.
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to carry out a public consultation before making an order to define prescribed expenditure. Three months is the Cabinet Office recommended period for Government consultations. Consultation responses would have to be published and reasons would have to be given by the Secretary of State for his decision. The amendment would ensure that the Secretary of State undertook appropriate consultation before making any orders to prescribe the expenditure of the fund.  The argument is much the same as for previous amendments on consultation. Our aim is simply public accountability and I look forward to hearing whether the Minister, who is such a fan of consultation, will accept the amendment.
Before I conclude, I will turn the clock back to something that the Minister said this morning about his Department suffering from consultation fatigue. He asked me to produce the documentation in support of the allegations that I made, and I see that he has it in front of him. I have a précis of that document. It is clear that, during consultation on the compact advocacy programme, there were various rounds, and in each round there seems to have been some dispute between the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and the Department.
I will not rehearse it all, and nor would you allow me to, Mr. Gale, but it is true that on 5 September the NCVO wrote to the Minister to outline its concerns about the lack of the 12-week consultation period that is normally required under the compact. That, it maintained, created breaches in several areas in the compact code of good practice on consultation and policy appraisal. There were various exchanges. Indeed, the Minister wrote to consultees on 25 July that he was conscious of not allowing the full 12-week period for consultation but did not provide a reason for that action.
The NCVO has made various allegations. It is concerned that the consultation process is contributing to the lottery consultation fatigue that it has identified in this sector and to which the Minister alluded earlier, suggesting that some of his officials were suffering from it. The lack of proper consultation has served to undermine the trust between the NCVO sector, which is the seminal sector, and the Department, at a time when relations should be good and communications should be open. The consultation credibility deficit has had an unfortunate consequence.
I shall not dwell on the matter because the Minister has the document before him.He will doubtless wish to reconsider his remarks as a result, and respond in the normal way at the conclusion of the debate.

Jo Swinson: First, Mr. Gale, I echo the comments of the hon. Member for East Devon (Mr. Swire) in welcoming you to the Chair.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Foster) and I support the amendment, as it would increase consultation. We had a somewhat heated debate this morning about prescription per se. The Government believe that it is important for the provision to remain in the Bill, but many people feel that it is worrying for the Secretary of State to have that power. The Minister sought to reassure us but, if that consultation procedure were included elsewhere in the Bill, it might reassure those with concerns.
As we have said, it is clearly important that the voice of the voluntary and community sector be heard. Earlier amendments were about the sector being consulted in other ways, but it is important to set out how consultation should take place. The amendment  sets out a process of consultation that fits with the 1998 compact, by which Departments are required to abide. Three months would be sufficient time for consultation, and a variety of methods could be used. The internet is a new and growing method of ensuring that consultation is extensive and meaningful. The NCVO supports the amendment; it says that it sits well with the compact.

Richard Caborn: I welcome you, Mr. Gale, to the Chair; I did so in your absence this morning. I can definitely say that you are not indulgent—I have been under your chairmanship before—but I know that you are fair.
I ask the Committee to resist amendment No. 29. It would insert a new subsection into section 22 of the National Lottery etc. Act 1993 requiring a statutory consultation process before the Secretary of State makes an order. It would also require such consultation to take place at least three months before an order was made. We discussed consultation requirements in our debate this morning, and I can add little to what I said then.
We expect to consult widely before making orders, as we did recently on the interim order for the New Opportunities Fund, but we also need flexibility. We may sometimes need to act quickly, and a minimum of three months consultation would not be practical. However, the safeguard is there, because such orders would still be open to parliamentary scrutiny, as they would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. With that assurance, I hope that the hon. Member for East Devon will withdraw the amendment.
There has been some talk of consultation. The compact is important to us and, yes, a departmental review was undertaken by the NCVO. It was funded by the Big Lottery Fund; in effect, we funded it. There is nothing like funding if Members want to criticise, but that is democracy. The Big Lottery Fund decided that it would be appropriate to fund the review.
I am not going to say that we got everything right—we did not—but the compact is a significant move in the right direction. We might have missed a few dates by two weeks here or three weeks there, but I did not say that my Department was suffering from consultation fatigue. It is not; it is there to be consulted. I said that those outside bodies had said that the consultation took a lot of time and resources, and some quantified that as fatigue. When one looks at this document, by any standards, consultation has taken place. Not all the answers that the NCVO sought are there, but no one could deny that we take seriously the compact and the consultation with the voluntary sector. I say that genuinely because of the massive contributions that it makes to our society and our communities, and long may they do so. Long may the lottery also be there to ensure that the voluntary sector can carry out its tasks. That is what the Bill is all about—the modernisation and evolution of the lottery. Given those few words of assurance, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Hugo Swire: There will be a lot of poring over Hansard tomorrow, Mr. Gale, as the Minister and I disagree over who said what and when. I think it was a bit of an aside when he said that, and I shall concede if I am wrong.
None the less, he did not address the amendment—he made remarks. Concentration fatigue is clearly there. It would have been reassuring had he dealt with my central point, which concerns the lack of trust that now exists between the NCVO and the Department. Lack of proper consultation has undermined that trust.
That is nothing new. The Minister, when it suits him, prays in aid his Department’s consultations on how the public wish to see lottery money spent. Consultation with 800 people was talked about this morning, 5 per cent. of whom were not in agreement. We were talking in tiny numbers. However, the NCVO represents 4,000 members and is widely recognised as the voice of the sector, both within Government and outside. In an answer to a written question tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) about which organisations had responded to the first round of the discussion about the merging of the New Opportunities Fund and the Community Fund, the Secretary of State did not mention the NCVO or acknowledge that several other organisations had also expressed concerns about the merger in their responses to the earlier consultation.
We seem to have consultation when it suits the Government. Results of the consultation appear to be ignored when it does not suit them. The Government largely ignored what the NCVO said in December 2002 about the proposed merger of the New Opportunities Fund and the Community Fund. The proposed merger came as a surprise to the voluntary and community sector, which did not believe that consultation had addressed the question of whether those two distributors should merge. We now find ourselves implementing this clause and relying yet again on the trust factor.
The Minister asked me to withdraw the amendment because he says that it would constrict the ability for manoeuvre. I must say that he and the Government have form. We cannot just let the amendment be withdrawn. We must be seen to insist on better consultation. There must be a defined period and identifiable means for that consultation, so that representations can be made.
The Minister cannot have it both ways. He is arguing that this is more than just a tidying-up exercise; that what he is doing reflects the views of the people out there—that is the phrase he uses. The people out there would be quite happy to have a three-month period of consultation before the Secretary of State can make such an order. During those three months, in a public and transparent manner, their views can at least be seen, if not taken into account, when orders are made under new subsection (3A).

Richard Caborn: Let me put on the record—yet again—the position with regard to the consultation that took place on our document. There were 850 respondents overall and approximately 630 people answered the questionnaire. However, 50 per cent. of respondents were not individuals but voluntary and community sector organisations and 21 per cent. were local authorities.
I do not want to put my officials to a lot of work, but I might have a cursory shot at how many people those local authorities and the voluntary sector bodies purport to represent. I do not want it to be thought that only 630 people responded. Organisations were consulted in some depth and the majority agreed with the themes that we have taken up in the Bill. Only 5 per cent. of the total number of organisations and individuals disagreed. We believe that that was reasonable.
I can also say—

Roger Gale: Order. For the benefit of hon. Members who have not served under my chairmanship before, I think it needs to be understood that even Ministers can only intervene when they are intervening. They cannot make speeches.

Hugo Swire: I am grateful for your protection, Mr. Gale.
Here we go again: the Minister refers to the 800-people poll and the figures, but we have already been around that ground this morning. I do not want to canter around the same course again, to put it in terminology that the Minister would enjoy. Five per cent. of the 800—40-odd people—disagree. I have been referring to the NCVO, which represents more than 4,000 members. The Minister cannot go on arguing that his poll of 800 respondents is the same thing. To attempt to protect those who want to be consulted, we shall maintain that the amendment should stay. I am sorry if the fact that people respond creates more work for the Minister or his officials, but I rather thought that that was the idea of a consultation and the driving force of the Bill. I see no reason, having heard the Minister’s response, in which he failed again to deal with our concerns, to do anything but press the amendment to a Division.

Richard Caborn: I shall try to help the Committee. I shall ask my officials to quantify the number of people in the organisations that made representations, and the electorates of the local authorities, to give a wider sense of the consultation than 830 people. I acknowledge that the Opposition must table amendments and probe to ensure that the Government act in the country’s and the electorate’s best interests. However, we shall now vote on whether to insist in the Bill that three months’ consultation should take place. The hon. Gentleman should reflect on that.
Under that amendment, if there were agreement that some issues needed to be dealt with expediently, it would be necessary to go through that consultation, because it was in the Bill—despite our assurances that  an affirmative resolution procedure could be used to provide for that. It is stupid to use the Bill to force through a situation that would prevent progress even when everyone wanted it. That is the danger of specifying such things in a Bill. It limits good governance.
I acknowledge that the amendment may well go to the vote, but it is not a good when making legislation to attempt to tie people’s hands, whoever is the incumbent. That is true whether we are talking about the Big Lottery Fund or the other distributors. It is necessary to inject common sense, accountability and transparency into the proceedings, and give Parliament the right to vote something down. I spelled that out clearly, when I asked the hon. Member for East Devon to withdraw the amendment. I have no doubt that my hon. Friends will vote the amendment down, but I want to explain that it is not good opposition to attempt to add such a provision to a Bill; it could stop good governance and good operation of the lottery. It would be negative.

Hugo Swire: The Minister is entitled to his views on what is or is not good opposition. We hope to give him the earliest possible opportunity to practise good opposition. It seems that the Minister is not keen to put anything in the Bill, and one has to ask why. It all comes back to the wonderful word that he has been using all morning: flexibility. To my way of thinking, flexibility allows for any kind of manoeuvring.
It is good opposition and good governance to insist that those who are responsible for making decisions about large amounts of money should be accountable. If the Minister has a problem with that, he should take it up with his colleagues in the Cabinet, because three months is the period recommended by the Cabinet Office for Government consultations. Responses have to be published and reasons given by the Secretary of State for his decision. If the Minister fundamentally disagrees with that, may I suggest that he take it up with the Cabinet Office?

Richard Caborn: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Hugo Swire: No, I am going to conclude. I listened to what the Minister said, but I still believe that the amendment is needed. Of course, the Opposition will be defeated, but at least we will be seen as a principled Opposition, acting in the best interests of those who do not want to be steamrollered by an almighty Government. Without further ado, I ask for a Division on the amendment.

Roger Gale: That is interesting. In effect, the past five minutes have been out of order, as the hon. Gentleman wound up the debate about five minutes ago. What has happened since should be put down not to indulgence but to flexibility. I simply say to both hon. Gentleman on the Front Benches, please do not try it again.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 9.

NOES

Question accordingly negatived.

Roger Gale: Before we start the next group of amendments, Mr. Sandall has brought to my notice the fact that Mr. Cook indicated that the clause has been satisfactorily debated, and that he does not recommend a clause stand part debate. I tell hon. Members that now, in case anybody wishes to try my patience by being unduly creative during the debate on the amendments.

Hugo Swire: I beg to move amendment No. 30, in clause 7, page 5, line 2, leave out ‘Ministers’ and insert ‘Parliament’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 77, in schedule 2, page 18, line 27, leave out ‘Ministers’ and insert ‘Parliament’.
No. 79, in schedule 2, page 18, line 37, leave out ‘Ministers’ and insert ‘Parliament’.
No. 82, in schedule 2, page 19, line 19, leave out ‘Ministers’ and insert ‘Parliament’.
No. 84, in schedule 2, page 20, line 6, leave out ‘Ministers’ and insert ‘Parliament’.
No. 85, in schedule 2, page 20, line 15, leave out ‘Ministers’ and insert ‘Parliament’.
No. 37, in clause 14, page 7, line 26, leave out ‘Ministers’ and insert ‘Parliament’.
No. 60, in clause 14, page 8, line 45, leave out ‘Ministers’ and insert ‘Parliament’.

Hugo Swire: We may need to be creative if we wish to elongate the proceedings. The amendments can be dealt with swiftly by the Minister, in which case we may have no reason to press for a Division on them. Of course, I retain the right to do so after we have heard the Minister’s response.
What is the reason for the amendments, all of which would leave out “Ministers” and insert “Parliament”? There is an anomaly in how the decisions are to be made. In Wales, for instance, the Welsh Assembly is to be consulted, but in Scotland the Scottish Ministers are to be consulted. There may be a good reason why the bodies that are to be consulted are the National Assembly for Wales, the Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure—clearly, that is where that decision will be made while Stormont is suspended—but I would be interested to hear the Minister explain what would happen once Stormont is up and running again. Furthermore, we have not mentioned the Isle of Man  or the Channel Islands. I ask the Minister to comment straightforwardly on the apparent anomaly of different consultees in the different parts of the kingdom. Is that a drafting matter, or is that how legislation is dealt with in different ways?

Jo Swinson: I echo the hon. Gentleman’s sentiments. Perhaps as a Member representing a Scottish constituency, I have a particular interest in the matter. I, too, find it strange when reading through the Bill to see the Welsh Assembly listed as a consultee, yet in Scotland the equivalent body, the Scottish Parliament, is not. It lists just “the Scottish Ministers”.
That led me to wonder why it was the Scottish Ministers and not the Scottish Executive, and which Scottish Ministers it would be. Would it be the Culture Minister or different Ministers? I wondered how much thought had gone into the provision. There may well be a good reason for suggesting “the Scottish Ministers”. I questioned it, however, because I wondered to what extent we in the Westminster Parliament should dictate to the devolved Administration in Scotland how it should wish to be consulted.
If the amendment were agreed to, and “the Scottish Parliament” rather than “the Scottish Ministers” were inserted, it would be up to the Scottish Parliament to set up a specific Committee, or to leave it to the relevant Minister or the Executive to liaise with the Secretary of State. At least that decision could be taken within the devolved Administration.
Since devolving power to Holyrood in Scotland is one excellent thing that Labour has done since 1997, I wonder why “the Scottish Ministers” is in the Bill. I shall be interested to hear the answer to that.

Richard Caborn: I hope that I can explain. After that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for East Devon will withdraw the first amendment of the Committee.
The amendments would change references to “the Scottish Ministers” to “the Scottish Parliament” where they occur in relation to consultation and consent requirements throughout the Bill. The amendments would require the Scottish Parliament to be consulted on various Big Lottery Fund orders and directions, and for its consent to be obtained in relation to various Big Lottery Fund appointments.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s aim, but we cannot accept his amendments. The aim of the provisions to which the amendments apply is to confer Executive functions on the Executive branches of the devolved Administrations. That is consistent with the manner in which existing functions in lottery legislation have already been conferred on Scottish Ministers through a number of transfer of function orders.
It would not make sense to confer Executive functions on to a legislative body. That approach has been thoroughly discussed with Scottish Ministers, and the Scottish Parliament has signified its assent to these provisions by passing a Sewel motion.
Confusion may have arisen because of the reference to the National Assembly for Wales. The reference reflects the fact that there is no legal distinction between the Executive and legislative arms of Government in Wales. The functions conferred by this Bill will be exercised by the Welsh Assembly Government.

Jo Swinson: On a point of curiosity, why is the reference to “the Scottish Ministers”? If the provision is to do with the Executive branch, why is not the reference to “the Scottish Executive”?

Richard Caborn: Because the responsibility is an Executive responsibility. It would not therefore be referred to the Scottish Parliament. The manner in which we are carrying out the provision has been discussed at length with the Scottish Ministers and with the Scottish Parliament, because it has been accepted through the Sewel motion. That motion has to go through the Scottish Parliament. There is an agreement with the Scots that this is the best way forward. We are now embodying that.

Jo Swinson: I accept the Minister’s point that the reference is to an Executive power, but, as a Scot, the phrase “the Scottish Ministers” seems a strange way of referring to the Administration in Holyrood. I should have thought that “the Scottish Executive” would have been the term used to refer to that group of people.

Richard Caborn: It is the phraseology that is used. We say in this Government, “the Secretary of State”. Who defines who the Secretary of State is? The answer to that is that they are the Secretary of State of Government. We are distinguishing between the Executive and the Parliament, and we are giving the powers to the Executive, not to the Parliament. That is different from what we have done in Wales, because in Wales there is no distinction between the Executive and the Parliament.

Tom Harris: My right hon. Friend and the hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire (Jo Swinson) might be interested to know that, from my memory of sitting in similar Committees in which there has been a Sewel motion to enable us to legislate for Scotland, the term always used is “the Scottish Ministers”. My understanding is that that phrase is used by civil servants in drafting legislation because it has a specific legal meaning in the context of devolution.

Richard Caborn: I have nothing further to add.

Hugo Swire: The Minister will be glad to hear that he is winning me round to his way of thinking. This was just a probing exercise, but I wonder whether you will indulge me for two minutes, Mr. Gale, because this is interesting in the context of our discussion. What body, if any, in the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands would be consulted?

Richard Caborn: That is a very good question. I shall write to the hon. Gentleman. I could give him an answer off the cuff, but it is bound to be wrong, so I hear what he says, and I shall make sure that I write.

Don Foster: A Sewel motion?

Richard Caborn: We do not have the Sewel motion in the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands to the best of my knowledge, but I shall clarify the position.

Hugo Swire: The Minister has done a good job in explaining the differences to those of us who are still coming to terms with the intricacies of devolution, and I am reassured on behalf of the people of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man that he will write to me. I hope, therefore, that he will not think it poor opposition if I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 - Meaning of “charitable expenditure”

Motion made and Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 6.

NOES

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13 - Establishment

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Don Foster: I take this opportunity to welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Gale, although I made reference to your chairmanship earlier. I shall seek to persuade the Committee to vote against clause 13 standing part of the Bill. I do so with considerable reluctance because, as I said earlier in response to the tirade that the Minister unleashed on the hon. Member for East Devon, I have very high regard for Sir Clive Booth and the team currently working with him on what has become called the Big Lottery Fund. I have no doubt that they will do phenomenally good work.
However, we are talking not about individuals but about a Government proposal. The first thing that strikes me is how odd it is to be here debating whether we should vote to allow the establishment of the Big Lottery Fund when, as everybody knows, it already exists and has done so for a long time. Indeed, we have received briefings from a body called the Big Lottery Fund, with a nice pink logo. We have noticed that it appears to have a website—www.biglotteryfund.org.uk—and a big advice line, which has been up and running for some time. It even produces a magazine called “The Big Times”. I am sure that you are an avid reader, Mr. Gale. If not, I am sure that it will not be long before it features as one of the publications on “Have I Got News For You”.
The Big Lottery Fund, the body that we are discussing whether to establish under the clause, was formally launched way back on 1 June 2004. That seems extremely odd. That is not to say that I am critical of the work being done by the organisation that has been masquerading as the Big Lottery Fund. Nevertheless we must ask ourselves whether we are entirely happy with the existence of that body.
Had the Minister been more willing to accept some of the amendments that were moved earlier today, I might have taken a different view about whether to support the clause. The Minister told us yesterday during Culture, Media and Sport questions:
“Through the Bill, we are taking no more powers than existed under NOF or the Community Fund”,—[Official Report, 24 October 2005; Vol. 438, c. 7.]
yet today we have been debating at some length the fact that the Government are taking considerably more powers in respect of the New Opportunities Fund and the Community Fund than before. I will give the Minister some examples in a second, because he is looking puzzled.
The starter for 10 in all of this is whether we are happy with the continuation of one part of what is to be the Big Lottery Fund, namely the New Opportunities Fund. I am sure that you will be well aware of this, Mr. Gale, because you were a critic of the NOF’s establishment, as were all your colleagues and mine. We are carrying through into the Big Lottery Fund something about which we had deep concerns.
 The Minister had an opportunity to allay manyof those concerns with new definitions of “charity” and the removal of certain powers of direction by the Secretary of State, but he chose not to do that. He said that our concerns about the NOF will continue into the Big Lottery Fund. Indeed, he will go further. He said yesterday that no additional powers were being taken on. Yet, although we are not debating clause 14—I fully appreciate that—it describes the function of the body that is to be set up by clause 13 and the directions given by the Secretary of State.
We will have an opportunity to discuss this in more detail later, but I remind the Committee of the precise powers of the Secretary of State over the body. Section 36E in clause 14 states:
“In exercising any of its functions the Big Lottery Fund shall comply with any direction given to it by the Secretary of State (subject to subsection (4)).”
It goes on to say that a direction under this section may
“(a)specify persons to whom the Fund may or may not make grants or loans;
(b)specify purposes for which the Fund may or may not make grants or loans;
(c)relate to the process used to determine what payments to make;
(d)relate to the terms and conditions on which the Fund makes grants or loans.”

Charles Walker: Can the hon. Gentleman envisage a situation in which every decision taken by the Big Lottery Fund has to be passed across the Secretary of State’s desk for approval?

Don Foster: I can indeed. To worry the hon. Gentleman even more, I point out that nobody, particularly the Minister, has yet been able to explain why this is a matter for the other distributors. Of course the Secretary of State can have a role in this; we would not want her not to have a role. We respect her—except for what she did on licensing yesterday—and we believe that it is right and proper for her to be involved. That is why we have no difficulty with a situation where the Secretary of State can say what she thinks to the other distributors and they have to take account of it. That is a long way away from a requirement that the Big Lottery Fund has to comply with directions that, as I said, cover absolutely everything: to whom, by what means and for what purposes the Big Lottery Fund can give money.
Earlier we had a discussion in which we sought to persuade the Minister that if we were going to accept that idea, it would be a good idea to have in the Bill some key assurances about 60 or 70 per cent. of the money, or thereabouts, going to the community and voluntary sector. Despite the compliance, that would have given us some sort of comfort blanket specifying that that proportion of funds would go to the area we are keen to see benefit. However, the Minister would not even give us that.
I hope that the Minister will understand that although I am in no way impugning the integrity, hard work or brilliance of Sir Clive Booth and his staff, I have grave concerns about the body that the Minister wants us to agree to set up, which has actually already been set up but not as a body corporate.

Hugo Swire: This morning, the hon. Gentleman touched on something that has taken up a lot of our time: the question of including in the Bill the 70 per cent. figure for which the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats have argued. The Minister rejected that, saying that it would be restrictive and he wanted flexibility. I am somewhat confused. This morning he said that he would give his verbal support to such an idea because it was not to be enshrined in law. Before that he said that it was a commitment. However, on Second Reading, he said in response to a question from the shadow Secretary of State:
“I give a guarantee that between 60 and 70 per cent. of the Big Lottery Fund’s income will go to communities or charities.”—[Official Report, 14 June 2005; Vol. 435, c. 175.]
Therefore, we have had everything: a guarantee, a commitment and now support. I wonder when we will get to a wish.

Don Foster: We will get a full answer in a moment when the Minister replies, but I hope before that the hon. Gentleman will make a further contribution. I am sure that he would wish to draw attention to the concerns of the NCVO and other organisations about the depth of consultation, an issue he picked up on just before lunch and about which he has now been more thoroughly briefed. If not, I have a briefing on the matter, but I thought that the hon. Gentleman might want to tell us why he is concerned, as I am, about the way the Government consulted on the creation of the new body.
I do not want to go into detail and steal the hon. Gentleman’s thunder, but I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that, notwithstanding what he told us before lunch, many voluntary and community organisations are deeply concerned about how that consultation took place. They are particularly concerned that in 2004, while consultation was still going on about the key purposes of the Big Lottery Fund, the Secretary of State announced what they were to be, before that consultation had been completed.
I end on a more conciliatory note. We are told that the bringing together of the New Opportunities Fund and the Communities Fund will bring economies of scale of between 10 and 20 per cent. That, I am sure, is likely to be the case; I have been assured by the Big Lottery Fund that it is. However, during the deliberations that led to the decision to go ahead with it, there was quite a lot of talk about some of the additional functions that the Big Lottery Fund might take on: being a centre for excellence, giving advice to anyone applying for a grant and so on.
I can find no reference to any of that additional activity in the Bill, nor can I find that in the explanatory notes. I may have missed it, but I hope that when the Minister responds, in addition to saying why we should go ahead and do exactly what he wants by accepting the Big Lottery Fund, despite all my misgivings and concerns about it, he will explain in a little more detail the fund’s area of activity. I particularly ask him to do that because there is concern that if it takes on the additional functions, that may reduce expertise among other distributors and the availability of funding for good causes.

Hugo Swire: It would be amusing indeed if the clause were pressed to a Division and the Committee decided to vote against it. As the explanatory notes state:
“This clause inserts provision into the 1993 Act establishing the Big Lottery Fund as a corporate body and inserting a new Schedule 4A (Schedule 2 to this Bill), which sets out detailed provisions on the Big Lottery Fund’s constitution, proceedings and money.”
If the Committee comes to its senses and votes against the clause, we could drive a coach and horses through the whole sorry enterprise.
We have made it clear where we are coming from and we articulated that in our pre-election manifesto. We were very clear that we wanted to return the national lottery to the four original pillars. We were unable on Second Reading and again in our deliberations today to be more compliant with the Minister’s point of view than he would have liked because there is so little that we can agree with in what is driving the Bill. I believe that the Liberal Democrats share that view.
As the hon. Member for Bath said clearly, we provided ample opportunity this morning for the Minister to take on board our concerns. Had he done so, he might have found us more willing to withdraw some of the amendments that we pressed to a vote.

Don Foster: Will the hon. Gentleman say that I said that not only clearly, but eloquently?

Hugo Swire: Indeed, the hon. Gentleman was extremely eloquent and has made up for any deficit he may allegedly have suffered from on Second Reading. He is also making up for an unfamiliar and unwelcome period of self-denying ordinance in not contributing to our proceedings as much as he could. No doubt that was the result of aftershock, having served so valiantly with the hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire on the Standing Committee that considered the London Olympics Bill.
The hon. Member for Bath was, I think, not quite with us at the beginning of our deliberations this afternoon and missed my points about consultation. I am happy to repeat them, or make slightly different ones, because they are seminal to the argument.
I was certainly not being personal about the current Secretary of State, and Hansard will bear me out when we read it tonight with our candles, night lights and cups of cocoa or Bovril. I was not any sense suggesting that the present Secretary of State would be involved in misappropriation of funds by using them to shore up a lack of Treasury dividends—perish the thought. However, I pointed out that when we legislate in this place, it is incumbent on us to do so regardless not only of who the Minister may be on a given day, but of who the Government may be on a given day. This is the fundamental point about the whole sorry enterprise: we are talking about the people’s money. The lottery is about individuals going out and spending their money in order to win prizes, to enrich themselves and to better their lives—a good Conservative philosophy—and to help out worthy and justifiable causes along the way.
That is what the late Prime Minister, Sir John Major—[Hon. Members: “Late?”] He was on occasion late. He is a certainly a former Prime Minister and a very great man, too. Where was I? In mid-flow, I think. Why did the former and not often late Prime Minister, Sir John Major, set up the national lottery? He set it up because, having been a Treasury Minister and then First Lord of the Treasury, he was acutely aware that the Government would be unwilling or unable to fund  in the way that he envisaged charities, sports, the arts and all the other areas that were covered by the original national lottery.
That was the idea. It was a simple philosophy that did not enjoy universal support at the time of its launch. It was much criticised. There was a tremendous and justifiable worry about families going into debt. However, here we are, years later, looking at a situation in which millions of pounds have reinvigorated parts of the country that Government money would not have reached because that would not have been provided for by the Treasury.
Cut to the early days of an incoming Labour Government and what do we have? There was a scratching of heads and people were saying, “Well, Treasury dividends are falling. There are worthy causes that follow our social and political agenda which we would like to fund. How are we going to do that? We are constricted by the 1993 Act and subsequent Acts. There is far too much scrutiny.” It was a brilliant idea to then say, “I know what we’ll do. As phase 1”—this is hypothetical—“we will merge these different funds and create a big lottery fund.”

Charles Walker: I hope that my hon. Friend agrees that one of the problems is that the Big Lottery Fund lacks legitimacy. It will lack legitimacy in the eyes of the public because basically its executive relies on the patronage of the Secretary of State. Legitimacy is important; otherwise it may well be known as the big ministerial slush fund. That, I think, is what my hon. Friend is driving at.

Hugo Swire: We must always be careful about casting aspersions on parentage. We know that the Government are the father and the mother of the Big Lottery Fund. My hon. Friend is entirely right: perhaps inadvertently, but, I would suggest, deliberately, the Government are blurring the lines between Government expenditure and national lottery revenue. As we proceed through the Bill over the next few days, we will see evidence on every page that that is precisely what they seek to do. Do the checks and balances exist? I suggest not. When the Opposition try to introduce them, we are ridiculed for being obstructive and for insisting that too much should be included in the Bill, thereby reducing the Secretary of State’s “flexibility”.

Andrew Selous: My hon. Friend mentions checks and balances, which the Minister mentioned in his remarks this morning. Does he agree that, although the decisions of the Big Lottery Fund can be challenged, if the Big Lottery Fund does not agree, it does not have to do anything about it, which is why including many of these points in the Bill is so important?

Hugo Swire: I bet my bottom dollar that when the Big Lottery Fund is officially set up it will be responsible only to itself and the Secretary of State. This is the last time that mere Members of Parliament will have a say in how the money is spent and where it goes.

Richard Caborn: The hon. Gentleman underplays the assurances of the chief executive of the New Opportunities Fund, who I hope will be the new chief executive of the Big Lottery Fund. He is acting in that capacity at the moment, although, for the record, the New Opportunities Fund and the Community Fund are currently legal entities in their own right. I said this morning that they would produce an annual report for both Houses of Parliament, which would be open to scrutiny by any Member of Parliament, any Opposition party that wanted it debated on the Floor of the House for debate, or any Select Committee.

Hugo Swire: I am interested to hear that. Returning to the Big Lottery Fund and its shadow creation, the Minister talked about Sir Clive Booth, who is, in effect, up and running. The Minister then gave another undertaking, and I should like to tease out of him whether it was a commitment or, as we suggested in our amendments, a guarantee that the documentation will be available, or whether he was merely expressing support for the idea. [Interruption.] Perhaps he is getting an answer through quickly. As to whether that information will be available to Members of Parliament in the Library, this morning I pressed him on that, and the hon. Member for Bath said that I had got it wrong. What the Minister said was not in the Bill; it was yet another wishy-washy wish. Will he respond directly to that, as we need to know what he is saying—whether it is a guarantee, an aspiration, a wish, a hope or whatever? Will he please tell the Committee what it is?

Richard Caborn: It is an undertaking—that is a different word—given by the chief executive to the voluntary service who work round my table in the Ministry that he would produce a report to put before Parliament, to which they would also have access. On additionality, the chief executive said that he was being pressed, and that he would ensure that there was some public accountability on additionality in the report. I agreed with him that it would be put before both Houses of Parliament and would then be open to the type of scrutiny that such reports receive. That is not new: it happens with a lot of non-departmental public bodies. Not only that, but I went on to say that it would not be the normal fall-back position, but would be extremely user friendly, so that many organisations that do not have lawyers and accountants working for them could, I hope, understand it. That is how far we are prepared to go with the voluntary sector.

Hugo Swire: I am grateful that the Minister has given an undertaking; I was increasingly suggesting that what this Bill needs is an undertaker. Clearly, again, in some smoke-filled room, the Minister has obtained an assurance from Sir Clive, who is not directly accountable to this House.
I want to reflect on the mess that the Government have got themselves into, because the point about the Big Lottery Fund, the establishment of which is dealt with in clause 13—is that it is long overdue. On reason for the large balances—the Minister has been going on and on about drawing down balances, and some of the distributors holding far too large balances—is  arguably the uncertainty created by the lack of a Bill. Nobody has known what is going on. The Government may have created the Big Lottery Fund, which is not at present accountable to Parliament because it exists in some sort of shadow organisation, but it is long overdue, to the extent that about three or four days ago, there arrived on my desk advance warning of a statutory instrument about the New Opportunities Fund because there is no other way of spending the money at present.
The Minister should not tell me that it is all a plan; it is not planned. The Bill is overdue. Third Reading and Report might not come until next year and meanwhile there is tremendous disagreement, particularly in the voluntary sector, and considerable disquiet about what is behind the measure. There are even some—although I am not sure that I include myself in their number—who are so cynical about the Government’s motivation in creating the Big Lottery Fund that they are asking whether it would not be easier, having created this Frankenstein’s monster, to move towards having one distributor. If one is already responsible for distributing 50 per cent. of lottery take, why not award oneself the other 50 per cent.? After all, there is no principle involved; what is the difference in distributing the whole lot?
No doubt, the Minister, or his successor, would come to a Committee, if that were required, and argue convincingly that there would be further economies of scale and tremendous savings, all of which would be passed on to the end user. After another consultation—800 hits on his website representing hundreds of local authorities and other vested interests across the country—we will be told that that is what the people in the street who play the game want. I do not think so. That is not what people want; they want to maintain the difference between Government spend and lottery spend.
The Minister said something quite extraordinary about his cosy little chat with Sir Clive in his smoke-filled room—they had discussed the question of additionality, which is to feature in the report that is to come to the House of Commons Library every year. Well, I have news for the Minister: he may have discussed what he means by additionality with Sir Clive, but he has not discussed it with Her Majesty’s Opposition or the Liberal Democrats, and I have a sneaking feeling that the hon. Member for Bath has some pretty interesting things to say about additionality. The Minister may find that he has to ring Sir Clive and summon him back for another cosy little chat because he has suddenly realised that his view of additionality is not shared by any of us.
Before I have a seizure, I shall conclude by referring back to the clause that we are debating, which is about establishment. This is not a cheap, opportunistic piece of opposition. [Laughter.] Well, how interesting; I gave the Minister greater credit. In all seriousness, my party feels strongly about this issue. I suspect that others in the Room, who were Members when the  national lottery was set up—long before I became a Member of the House—feel pretty irritated and nervous about how it has been hijacked since Labour came to power.
We feel strongly about the national lottery because it is a Conservative idea that was designed to enliven the lives of people across the country who were beyond Government reach. That is not just the view of the Opposition. If it were, the Minister might be able to put his hands behind his back and give a knowing look, but he cannot. The Government cannot hide behind the excuse that we are opportunistic every time we oppose them. We are not opportunistic; we are the Opposition. There is a difference.
It is not only the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats who oppose the clause and the Bill so vehemently. I refer again to the concerns of the voluntary sector about the 2002 merging of the New Opportunities Fund and the Community Fund. The announcement came as a surprise to the voluntary and community sector; it did not believe that the consultation had addressed the question whether those distributors in particular should merge. The sector felt very strongly that no business case had been made for the merger and that the DCMS was acting in a way that was totally at odds with the compact.
I would argue that no business case has been made for either the merger or the creation, in this clause, of the Big Lottery Fund. The simple reason for no business case being made is that the proposed changes are not driven by business, economies of scale or a desire to get more money to the end user more quickly. Nothing in the Bill suggests that that would be the case if it were passed. The changes are driven by naked politics—a desire to create a lottery fund that controls 50 per cent. of all lottery takings to make up a shortfall in Government spend. That is a disgrace, and we should resist the clause in its entirety.

Richard Caborn: I shall respond to the debate factually, without rhetoric. If the hon. Gentleman had given way about 10 minutes ago, he would have learned that it was not Sir Clive who had the meeting, but the chief executive, Stephen Dunmore, as I said at the time and as Hansard will show. Stephen Dunmore is the chief executive of an NDPB—the accounting officer, not a chairman. There are clear guidelines for the chief executives and accounting officers of an NDPB. The hon. Gentleman will find in schedule 2 and in section 34 of the 1993 Act that such people are, as accounting officers, accountable to Parliament through their annual reports. That was how Parliament decided they would have some accountability when the NDPBs were set up. That, I suggest, is taken into account when an accounting officer of Stephen Dunmore’s standing gives assurances at a meeting.
We have been accused of failing to consult the voluntary sector, but the meeting at which these questions were raised was part of the consultation. It was held in my office, as I am the Minister responsible, and was attended by representatives of the voluntary sector, Stephen Dunmore and my officials. Stephen Dunmore took on board, very positively, the questions asked by the voluntary sector. He did not then go out  and consult the rest of the world; he decided that with his powers and accountability to Parliament, one way forward would be to produce a report with a number of features for the voluntary sector and both Houses of Parliament. It would also be reproduced in a way that was user-friendly. I do not think that any accounting officer or chief executive from an NDPB could be more user-friendly.
Let me say before there is any criticism that it was not the chairman but the chief executive who was involved. What I am proposing will be part of the mechanisms through which the House holds to account the Secretary of State, whoever he or she may be, and the accounting officers.
The hon. Member for Bath said that the Big Lottery Fund was in operation; I can inform him that it is operating in name only. The legal entities of the Community Fund and the NOF are now working jointly. The Bill creates distinct legal bodies and if it is passed, which I hope it is, the Big Lottery Fund will become a statutory body in its own right and an NDPB.

Don Foster: I intervene for a bit of light relief and to give the Minister time to flick through the next part of his notes. I fully understand that the Big Lottery Fund is not currently a corporate body. Since he says that the other bodies are operating as independent, separate bodies, will he tell the Committee whether, to the best of his knowledge, it would be possible to find a piece of headed notepaper with New Opportunities Fund or Community Fund on its letterhead?

Richard Caborn: I did not say that. I will repeat what I said just for the record: they are distinct legal bodies—administrative bodies. The additional functions that hon. Members asked for, the centre of excellence and so on, are dealt with in clause 14, in new section 36D of the 1993 Act, which we will come to in a few minutes.
Clause 13 establishes the Big Lottery Fund as a corporate body and inserts a new schedule 4A, which is in schedule 2 of the Bill—

Don Foster: I apologise for interrupting the Minister, but it may help to clarify later deliberations. He will be aware that in the national lottery funding decision document of July 2003, specific reference is made to the new body’s responsibilities from page 20 onwards. Those responsibilities include leading on best practice, providing a single point of entry for new applicants unsure of where to seek advice, being the first port of call for applicants who feel that their project does not fit neatly with other distributors’ terms of reference, and developing pre-application support and common standards of service. Is the Minister saying that new section 36D covers all those points?

Richard Caborn: Yes. It states:
“The Big Lottery Fund may give advice about”
and gives a list from (a) to (c). The official legal advice that I am given is that that would cover the matters that the hon. Gentleman has just raised.
Schedule 2 sets out detailed provisions on the Big Lottery Fund’s constitution, proceedings and money. Much of that is standard provision for public bodies, as I have indicated, but I would like to highlight a couple of points. Paragraph 1 of the schedule, which deals with membership of the Big Lottery Fund, provides that there will be 12 members, appointed by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may vary that number by order following consultation with the devolved Administrations. One member will be appointed as chairperson. England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland will each have one member, who may be the chairperson, appointed to represent their interests, with the agreement of the relevant devolved Administration.
Paragraph 7 requires the Big Lottery Fund to establish a committee for each of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, to be chaired by the relevant member of the fund. The committees will be responsible for devolved expenditure in respect of their countries. The members of the committees will be appointed by the Big Lottery Fund, with the agreement of the Secretary of State in the case of the England committee and of the relevant devolved Administration in the others.

Charles Walker: Will the Minister shed some light on how the Secretary of State will conduct the recruitment process for the 12 members?

Richard Caborn: As we always do—in accordance with the Nolan procedures for public appointments, which are transparent. We have the public’s list, which involves many people writing in and which is held centrally. There will be no difference in respect of this measure. The situation will be the same as it is for any NDPB or any other public body. All of us are charged with following the Nolan procedures, which, I think, resulted from the last Administration’s problems.
The Bill represents a significant devolution of power to the devolved Administrations, and the creation of the country committees is a key way of achieving that. Paragraph 20 of schedule 2 allows the fund to invest money in an interest-bearing account. Most money that the fund receives will be held in the national lottery distribution fund and invested by the national debt commissioners under section 32 of the 1993 Act. However, non-lottery money received pursuant to new section 36C of the Act, which is inserted by clause 14, may be invested under this power. I beg to move that clause 13 and schedule 2 stand part of the Bill—

Roger Gale: Order. We have a full and fervent debate on schedule 2 to come. I think that the Minister is being a little previous; I noticed that in his earlier remarks he was referring fairly heavily to schedule 2. I am sure that he will not repeat those remarks later.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 7.

NOES

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 - New Schedule 4A to the National Lottery etc. Act 1993

Roger Gale: Before we start the debate, let me say that, having studied the Bill carefully, I am acutely conscious of the fact that many of these clauses and issues overlap. I do not have a big problem with hon. Members introducing matters into the debate if they feel that that is appropriate, on the strict understanding that they do not seek to do the same thing all over again in the stand part debate on schedule 2.

Hugo Swire: I beg to move amendment No. 76, in schedule 2, page 18, leave out lines 23 and 24.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 78, in schedule 2, page 18, line 32, leave out sub-paragraph (5).
No. 75, in schedule 2, page 19, line 4, at end insert—
‘2AAn appointment of a member shall be for a term no longer than five years.’.
No. 80, in schedule 2, page 19, line 12, leave out ‘unfit or unwilling’ and insert ‘or unfit’.
No. 81, in schedule 2, page 19, line 13, at end insert
‘and that decision has been ratified by a two-thirds majority of the members excluding the member who is the subject of the investigation.’.
No. 83, in schedule 2, page 19, line 44, leave out ‘obtain the consent of’ and insert ‘consult’.
No. 86, in schedule 2, page 21, line 5, leave out from ‘committees’ to end of line 6 and insert—
‘14AA quorum for a committee shall be two-thirds of the total number of members appointed.’.
No. 87, in schedule 2, page 21, line 16, leave out ‘person as Chairman or’.

Hugo Swire: The amendments relate to the constitution and membership and flag up several concerns about the day-to-day operations of the Big Lottery Fund, which we have in a sense just voted into existence—or failed to vote out of existence in the previous division.
We want some powers to be transferred from the Secretary of State to the Big Lottery Fund. We feel that the Big Lottery Fund does not have as much operational independence as it should. Amendments Nos. 78, 80, 81 and 83 deal with the BLF taking some powers from the Secretary of State, and the remaining amendments deal with the operational matters of the BLF.
Amendment No. 76 would result in the chairman of the BLF board not being responsible for representing the interests of a specific part of the country—Wales or Scotland, for example. There could be—I am not saying that there would be—a conflict of interest, and the chairman should not be seen to be pitching for one part of the country. A conflict of interest could result in the chairman being thought to favour one particular part of the country. At least the appearance of fairness and impartiality should be maintained, and the chairman of the BLF board should not be influenced or otherwise by one particular part of the country.
Amendment No. 78 removes the Secretary of State’s ability to expand or shrink the BLF board at whim. A Secretary of State—not the current Secretary of State, clearly, but a future Secretary of State—who felt that they were not getting co-operation from the Big Lottery Fund board would be able to pack it full of those remaining supporters who had not already been accelerated into the upper House. If there were any left by that stage, they could all be packed onto the Big Lottery Fund board until it was so big that the Secretary of State was convinced that he or she had their own placemen on it.

Charles Walker: I may not have read the provision as closely as I should have, and I apologise, but is the intention that people be appointed to the board for fixed terms? That would—crikey—it would preclude the Secretary of State from weeding out those recalcitrant members who went against his or her view.

Hugo Swire: Crikey indeed. As the Bill is constructed, weeding out is precisely what could happen. That is why in amendment No. 75 we suggest inserting in schedule 2:
“An appointment of a member shall be for a term of no longer than five years.”
That amendment would limit the appointment period of a BLF board member to five years—about the same duration as a term as a Member of Parliament. That should go some way to addressing my hon. Friend’s concerns.
In amendment No. 80, we propose removing from schedule 2 “unfit or unwilling”, and inserting “or unfit”. The reasons behind the amendment are quite clear. The Bill as drafted gives the Secretary of State the ability to remove an unwilling board member. “Unwilling” could mean anything—unwilling to turn up to meetings, to speak in meetings, or to come clothed to meetings; it could cover any number of ways that might cause offence. Whether it would be desirable for him or her to be clothed or unclothed would depend on who the member was, but we must not digress—or, indeed, undress. The point is that that the present wording it leaves it open to a Secretary of  State to decide that somebody is unwilling because they do not toe the party line, or do the bidding of the Secretary of State. That might sound rather Stalinist, but I look forward to hearing the Minister’s justification for the provision.

Andrew Turner: My hon. Friend did not quote the words in line 12, namely,
“in the opinion of the Secretary of State... unwilling”
I ask my hon. Friend to put himself in the position of a member of the board who is not himself unwilling, but who in the Secretary of State’s opinion is unwilling. Why should the Secretary of State know better than the board member whether he is unwilling?

Hugo Swire: There are occasions when others know whether one is unwilling better than one does oneself, but I agree with the sentiments expressed by my hon. Friend. We cannot table amendments to cover every inconsistency in the Bill or everything that gives the Secretary of State unacceptable powers, which is precisely what the Bill does from A to Z. His point is well made and the question remains: what constitutes unfit or unwilling? If a member is classed as unwilling because he is lazy, surely he is unfit. However, the present definition of unwilling might mean anybody who does not always agree with the Secretary of State. I am always interested in the Minister’s responses, but I shall be particularly so in this one. We are not trying to scupper this part of the schedule, we are just trying to help with what we regard as better drafting and to remove the lingering sense that the measure is all about a concentration of power in the hands of an overmighty—probably almighty too—Secretary of State.
Amendment No. 81 provides that the Secretary of State cannot summarily remove a member of the BLF board unless that decision is ratified by a vote of the board. I hope that that amendment goes some way towards addressing the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner). We have tried to apply a lock on anybody deciding that somebody else is unwilling, and providing that any such decision should be ratified by two thirds of the membership of the BLF, excluding the person in question, is a pretty good way of achieving that. Being judged by one’s peers is always better than being judged by a member of the Executive. I hope that he would feel that that proposal was worthy of his support.
Amendment No. 83, too, gives more power to the BLF board and less to the Secretary of State. All the amendments are designed, as I said, to loosen the grip of the Secretary of State, and to give more power to the devolved board. If the amendment is made, when the Big Lottery Fund appoints committees to make decisions about devolved expenditure, it will not have to obtain the consent of each country’s lead body—in other words the Secretary of State for Scotland or Scottish Ministers—before appointing members of that committee. The amendment requests that the Big Lottery Fund board merely consults the devolved bodies. Requiring the Big Lottery Fund to obtain the agreement of the Secretary of State, the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Ministers, the Northern  Ireland Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure, and perhaps even the Tynwald and the various legislative authorities of the Channel Islands—about which the Minister is going to write to me this evening—to appoint someone to a committee effectively demands that it obtains the agreement of politicians even regarding minor appointments. The Big Lottery Fund seems to have few powers indeed, but if it cannot appoint its own committees and deal with people whom it regards as unfit to be members of its board, it seems to be an animal without teeth. I am certain that the Minister wants that particular animal to have some teeth.
The penultimate amendment in the group, amendment No. 86, is designed to ensure that meetings of the Big Lottery Fund board are quorate. We feel that a quorum should be fixed when a committee is dealing with the distribution of large sums of money. At the moment, that is not the case, as the clause states:
“The Fund may, subject to this Schedule, regulate its procedure and the procedure of its committees (and may, in particular, make provision for a quorum).”
We suggest that we firm up that provision. If the powers that be deem the 12 members—or however many there are meant to be, because unless our amendment is passed there will be any number—to be unwilling or unco-operative and vote them off the board, we could be left with few members making huge decisions about vast amounts of money. That is, of course, completely unacceptable to us. [Interruption.] It sounds as though it is wholly, completely and totally out of the question as far as the hon. Member for Bath is concerned. No doubt we will hear more from him in a minute.
The final amendment in the group is amendment No. 87, which deals with the proceedings of the Big Lottery Fund board in the event of a defect in the appointment of a person as chairman or member. We felt that a defect in the appointment of the chairman could and should affect the Big Lottery Fund proceedings. Not much can happen without a chairman, Mr. Gale, but the amended schedule would mean that a defect in the appointment of a member would not necessarily affect the validity of proceedings.
It is arguable that the amendments are pieces of housekeeping, but they reflect the fact that individually, but collectively the Opposition—I use the term in an all-embracing manner—are voicing their continuing concerns that the Secretary of State has too much control and that the Big Lottery Fund board has too few teeth.

Don Foster: The hon. Gentleman will have to wait a little while to find out whether he has our support. My hon. Friend the Member for East Dunbartonshire will try to catch your eye, Mr. Gale.
May I, in the spirit of interest and co-operation, ask the hon. Gentleman a question of which I have given him prior notice? Will he share with the Committee his thoughts on a concern that I have already raised with him? He is right to propose that the chairman should not be someone who also represents England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland on the board. Does he  share my concern that his amendment does not go far enough and that, were he to be successful in deleting paragraph 1(4)(b) of schedule 2, it would remain possible for the Secretary of State to appoint a chairman who could be such a person? Does he agree with me that it would be extraordinarily helpful if the Minister not only accepted the amendment but suggested a further amendment to ensure that what the hon. Gentleman is desperate to prevent happening does not do so?

Hugo Swire: One day pigs will fly, and when I see a pig flying down the Thames, I will know either that within a few minutes people in white coats will come to take me away and stop me being on the Big Lottery Fund board, or that the Minister is about to accept one of my amendments. I do not know which is likely to occur sooner.
The hon. Gentleman did indeed notify me of his question. He makes a good point, but I still think that our drafting holds up. If he wishes to press the matter, there are two channels open to him: one is to use his own persuasive powers in a few moments to convince the Minister that this provision needs tidying up; the other is to bring the matter up on Report and Third Reading, in the dim and distant future when hopefully we will both still be alive. I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has given an indication that he supports the thinking behind the amendment, if not its execution.
The amendment is designed to remove doubt. Many of the amendments are designed to protect the Big Lottery Fund board, not to reduce its efficiency. We believe that if there is to be such a board it should be regulated, but that it should have genuine independence. We also believe that, like Caesar’s wife, it should be above suspicion. I submit that the board and its members—12 men and women, good and true—will not be above suspicion if they are liable to be summoned and dismissed by the Secretary of State for being unwilling; or if they are likely to go to a meeting one day only to find that the room has 45 other people with whom the Secretary of State has decided to pack the meeting; or if the chairman, via the sub-committees of the regions, were suddenly to divert 45 per cent. of the 50 per cent. of the Big Lottery funding to shore up Labour marginal seats in Scotland—no offence intended to Scotland, of course. We are trying to prevent that sort of thing happening, and there seems no better time to do so than at this stage of the Bill.
Having mentioned that wonderful part of the United Kingdom, I hope that others might now join in the debate.

Jo Swinson: I would like to put the hon. Member for East Devon out of his misery and inform him that we do support many of the amendments in this group. He was not even denied the opportunity to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Bath speak to those amendments.
In relation to amendment No. 76, it is clear that a conflict of interest could be created if someone had responsibility both for standing up for the interests of one particular part of the UK and for taking an overall view of the board. Will the Minister put our minds at rest on that matter?
Amendment No. 78 is interesting. I can understand why the Government would want to ensure that the Secretary of State had the power to vary the size of the board; I can conceive of various situations in which it might be desirable to do so. However, the concerns that both the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives have expressed today about the overall constitution of the Big Lottery Fund show that there is concern about what that power would mean. Pleas to ensure proper consultation with the voluntary sector have fallen on deaf ears, and we do not know when a guarantee is a guarantee or when it is just an expression of support. We therefore have a right to be very concerned about the Secretary of State’s ability to decide how many or how few members to have on the board.
On amendment No. 75, it is entirely sensible to have a limit on how long a person should hold a position on the board. Such a time limit is common in many organisations to ensure that fresh ideas are proposed. The board should be dynamic, although some might say, “Fortunately, that does not happen in Parliament.”
I am not going to discuss every amendment in the group, but I have one question to ask about amendment No. 80. If the amendment were accepted, the paragraph would read:
“The Chairman or another member may be removed from office by the Secretary of State on the grounds that ... he is, in the opinion of the Secretary of State unable,”
or
“unfit to discharge the functions of his office.”
I am struggling to conceive of a case in which someone would be so dreadful that we would want to remove them from the board, or that the definition of being unable or unfit to discharge the functions of his office would not be adequate to ensure that someone who clearly should not be on the board was not on it. Will the Minister put our minds at rest at give us an example of such a situation?

Andrew Turner: Before I add a few thoughts to those that have already been expressed, may I belatedly welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Gale? I shall speak only to amendments Nos. 80 and 83, although that in no way diminishes the importance of the other amendments in the group.
I referred to amendment No. 80 earlier. The Secretary of State seems to believe that she can detect the unwillingness of someone who is incapable of detecting it himself—[Interruption.] The Minister is sniggering, but presumably the prescience of the Secretary of State knows no bounds and he is aware of examples.

Charles Walker: Surely someone would offer their resignation and move on to new pastures if they were unwilling to participate.

Andrew Turner: My hon. Friend has abruptly brought to a halt my remarks on the amendment, because that was the direction in which I was drifting. I am sad to say that the shooting of foxes in Committee is still permitted under the Hunting Act 2004. None the less, I want to know the circumstances in which the Secretary of State can detect that someone is unwilling if that person has not indicated that he is unwilling. If he is not unwilling but the Secretary of State forms the opinion that he is unwilling, who is to adjudicate? Under the Bill, it is the Secretary of State, which is a curious, almost Gilbertian position.
Amendment No. 83 would remove “obtain the consent of” and insert “consult”. It is worth turning the page of the Bill, because at the top of page 20 are listed the bodies that the Big Lottery Fund must consult. In the case of the committee concerned with England, the fund must consult the Secretary of State. In the case of the committee concerned with Wales, the fund must consult the National Assembly for Wales. I recognise that the Secretary of State is the body in England that lays regulations before Parliament, and that the equivalent in Wales is the National Assembly, because in effect the Assembly has the regulation-making power in respect of devolved matters in Wales. However, the Bill goes on to say that in the case of the committee concerned with Scotland, the fund must consult the Scottish Ministers. Will the Minister clarify which Scottish Ministers he has in mind? Is he talking about all the Scottish Ministers, or about a Scottish Minister with a particular responsibility. [Interruption.] I am told that we have been through this.

Richard Caborn: Ad nauseum.

Andrew Turner: If so, perhaps the Minister can anticipate my final question. Why are Northern Ireland Ministers not mentioned, but a Department is referred to instead? There is a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and there would be Ministers who were responsible if Northern Ireland had devolved powers. Is there a difficulty in that Ministers in Northern Ireland are drawn from conflicting political parties, not political parties that generally agree with each other, so that it is a matter of some importance in the devolution settlement which political party holds a particular Ministry? Three or four political parties could be dissatisfied were Sinn Fein to hold the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure in Northern Ireland. Similarly, three or four political parties could be dissatisfied if the Democratic Unionist party were to hold it.

Adam Afriyie: In any organisation, there are questions of power and control. Much of what we have been debating today, especially on these clauses, is about the power and control that the Secretary of State has over the Big Lottery Fund. The ultimate power is that of appointing someone to a job and the ultimate sanction is that of removing them from it, so the maximum amount of influence is available to the Secretary of State. I ask the Minister to focus on two matters: the powers that the Secretary of State has over the appointment and removal of the  Big Lottery Fund chairman and members of the board, and the differences in the Secretary of State’s powers over the Big Lottery Fund and over the other funds? If the Secretary of State can control the decision making of the board by the ability to use the ultimate sanction of removing the chairman, that must be examined and explained much more carefully.

Charles Walker: With the Big Lottery Fund, are we not in danger of creating 12 non-jobs? On page after page of the Bill, it seems that every move the board members make will be second-guessed by the Secretary of State. Indeed, if they were to demonstrate autonomy in their decision making, they could be removed. Surely we want the Big Lottery Fund to have legitimacy in the eyes of the public. As such, the board members must sometimes be able to go against the wishes of the Secretary of State and show that they are thinking primarily of the British taxpayer and those who will benefit from the projects that are funded. The Bill does the Big Lottery Fund a huge disservice. What is the point of having such a fund? Let us just be done with it, give the final powers to the Secretary of State and end this charade.

Roger Gale: Before I invite the Minister to respond, the hon. Member for Isle of Wight, for wholly proper parliamentary reasons, was unable to be here at the start of the proceedings and did not hear the debate on Scottish Ministers. Were the Minister to try to reply to his questions on that matter, I would have to rule him out of order, but it is entirely up to him to decide whether to reply on the Northern Ireland Department.

Richard Caborn: I have no intention at all of replying to those questions, Mr. Gale, but I thank you for your ruling. I shall try to answer the debate effectively, but I preface my remarks by pointing out that all the powers in this Bill were included in the London Olympics Bill—exactly the same powers, exactly the same wording—and were accepted without a vote or any expressions of concern.

Hugo Swire: May I respond to that?

Richard Caborn: I would like to make some progress. [Interruption.]

Roger Gale: Order. The Minister is not giving way.

Richard Caborn: Amendment No. 76 would mean that the chairman of the lottery fund was unable also to represent the interests of England, Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland in the chair of the relevant country committee. Those committees were set up to exercise functions in relation to devolved expenditure in each country. I see no reason why the chairman of the Big Lottery Fund should not be able to chair one of those committees. After all, the committees and the fund work toward the same objective.
Amendment No. 78 would prevent the Secretary of State from varying the number of members of the Big Lottery Fund from 12 following consultation with  devolved Administrations. That appears short-sighted. Not only would it make the arrangements inflexible, but restricting membership to a set number would make it difficult to cope with future circumstances.
I see no need for amendment No. 75, which specifies that members should be appointed for no longer than five years. That is similar to the standard Nolan procedure, which allows members appointed to public bodies to remain in post for no more than 10 years.

Adam Afriyie: Would the Minister be prepared to have a range of numbers of board members, say between 12 and 15, or 12 and 16? If he leaves it open-ended, he may be liable to the accusation that it would allow gerrymandering.

Richard Caborn: Anybody would think that we were reinventing the wheel. A lot of non-departmental public bodies have been set up over many years. The procedures in the Bill are no different from those used when setting up the New Opportunities Fund. They can be found in the London Olympics Bill and elsewhere. They have been operating rather successfully for many years. We do not need to reinvent the wheel. I see no need for amendment No. 75.
Amendment No. 80 seeks to change the provision on tenure in paragraph 4(1)(b). It would allow the Secretary of State to remove the chairman or members if they were deemed to be unfit or unable to discharge the functions of the office. If the member or chairman were unwilling to perform the functions they were employed to undertake, regardless of whether they were unable or unfit, the Secretary of State should have the power to remove them.
When reappointing a member, the Secretary of State would normally seek feedback from the chairman. This is the real world that we live in—I hope—and such provisions have successfully been in operation for many years. The Secretary of State would get feedback from the chairman on a member’s performance; it would be done informally, but it is normal practice nevertheless. If a member were deemed not to be performing as required, the Secretary of State would follow the procedures in paragraph 4.
Amendment No. 81 would reduce the Secretary of State’s power to remove a member from office, as it would mean that his decision would need to be ratified by two-thirds of the members. That seems unnecessary, as I am certain that the Secretary of State would have consulted the chairman of the board before using the power, and one would expect—again, it happens in the real world—the chairman to have consulted fellow members of the board on such issues.
Amendment No. 83 is about the country committees, which have an important role to play in the delivery of the fund. They represent a significant devolution of power from the devolved Administrations, and they are established to exercise the fund’s function in relation to each country’s expenditure. It is vital that those committees function  effectively and that they have the right membership. It is right that the Big Lottery Fund should select and propose their membership, but the Secretary of State or the relevant devolved Minister should have the final say over who is appointed. A requirement only to consult under amendment No. 83 would not be sufficient.

Charles Walker: What would happen if the Secretary of State or someone from the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly had a fundamental disagreement about an appointee to the board? Is that likely to happen, and what procedures would be in place to break that deadlock if it did?

Richard Caborn: There is one step before that: broadly speaking, people tend to be vetted by the public appointments panel, and the Nolan procedures are followed. Normally, people put their names forward as a result of an advertisement. That process usually results in boards finding fit and proper people to serve on them. It is not a process that allows a person to say, “You can sit on that board.” It is not like that in the real world. That is not allowed because of what happened under previous Administrations. We now have the Nolan procedures and a central list, and there is transparency. People are appointed through those normal procedures, and I do not believe that anyone could get over those hurdles who was not a fit and proper person. The Big Lottery Fund is quite happy with the arrangement, and we do not believe that it would hinder the fund’s ability to recruit a good executive committee.
Amendment No. 86 seeks to prescribe a quorum. That is totally unnecessary. There is no reason that the fund cannot decide that matter for itself, as do other public bodies.
Amendment No. 87 seeks to provide that the validity of the proceedings of the fund or a committee would be affected by a defect in the appointment of a person as chairman. Such a provision would be unusual and potentially awkward if the board’s proceedings were affected because of unforeseen problems in the appointment of a chairman.

Andrew Turner: I take the Minister back to my comments on amendment No. 83. You, Mr. Gale, said that the Minister was allowed to answer my point on Northern Ireland, but he has not done so.

Richard Caborn: I will come to that.

Andrew Turner: I apologise.

Richard Caborn: Apology accepted. I shall now answer the Northern Ireland question.
The Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure works under the direction of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland during suspension or the direction of the First Minister once the suspension is over, so there is no need to change the reference to the Department.

Adam Afriyie: May I be clear about one of the Minister’s earlier answers? Is there no constitutional difference between the appointment procedure for the chairman of the Big Lottery Fund board and those for  the chairmen of the Heritage Lottery Fund and the other funds? Is it exactly the same procedure with the same powers?

Richard Caborn: Yes, it is the same procedure, but obviously the powers are different because one is a bigger fund. The procedures, including the Nolan procedures, are exactly the same as for any other non-departmental public body.

Hugo Swire: Goodness me. I do not know where to start. I thought that the amendments were helpful; I thought that they would reinforce the fact that there is clear water between the Secretary of State and the board, which would help the Minister to show those outside this Room that he is committed to the Big Lottery Fund board having genuine independence from the Secretary of State. By rejecting all the amendments, he has yet again shown that that is not the case.
At the beginning of his speech, the Minister implied that the Opposition were once again being opportunistic or over-zealous by tabling amendments to the schedule because the London Olympics Bill had been virtually nodded through. I cannot say much about that Bill—I was not a member of the Committee that considered it—but that may be because the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats largely agreed with what the Bill was trying to do.
My party is reassured that the Olympics has a greater chance of success due to the fact that two Tory peers—Lords Moynihan and Coe—are pretty much in charge of it. We are supportive because we know that the Olympics and everything around it will probably be run pretty well. [Interruption.] I say “pretty well” because of a legitimate concern about lottery overspend. The creation of the Big Lottery Fund and the potential for lottery overspend at the Olympics may not be unrelated.

Richard Caborn: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that only members of the Conservative party will have any credibility as chairmen of those organisations?

Hugo Swire: That is certainly not what I said. I was saying that, in that case, we are reassured that two people with sound business experience, who happen to be Conservative peers, are in charge. I would say that the Olympics had a better chance of success than other enterprises being run, with rather less experience, by the present Government—I cite the example of the great success of the dome.

Roger Gale: Order. We have done the dome today. I can find many things in schedule 2, but I can find nothing relating to qualifications. The hon. Gentleman is possibly out of order.

Hugo Swire: I stand corrected, Mr. Gale.
The real problem here, if we do not press the amendment to a Division, is what we will allow to slip through under the net. We would effectively give the Secretary of State total control over the appointment of the board and the ability to remove people as and when she saw fit. We would give her the power to expand the board if those left were still unwilling. If she  had sacked so many of them that they had be given a vestige of independence, she could pack it full with placemen. According to the Minister, the Secretary of State will rely on feedback. If the chairman is not up to standard, the board will rely on feedback and the Secretary of State will presumably deliberate and pronounce sentence on the wretched chairman.
I am not a lawyer, but I do not know that the highest court of appeal in the land can be the Secretary of State who has originally nodded through the appointment and then made a decision based on feedback. What rights will this poor fed-back chairman have? No doubt, like most of my constituents who reach the end of the road in their cases, he would scoot off to the European Court of Human Rights. Undoubtedly his rights would have been infringed. I hope that the Minister will answer those 10 points. That was a joke. That is what we will be nodding through. The Secretary of State will be the highest appeal for this poor fed-back chairman and so it goes on.

Don Foster: In view of the time and the Minister’s intransigence on this important matter, does the hon. Gentleman agree that there may be some merit in seeking permission to withdraw the amendment now in order to regroup and find an alternative method of addressing the issue at a later stage?

Hugo Swire: That was extremely elegantly put by the hon. Member for Bath. It is almost bath time so perhaps we should not delay proceedings any further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Hugo Swire: I beg to move amendment No. 91, in schedule 2, page 21, leave out line 22.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 88, in schedule 2, page 21, line 22, leave out ‘the Secretary of State’ and insert ‘Parliament’.
No. 89, in schedule 2, page 21, line 23, leave out ‘the Secretary of State’ and insert ‘Parliament’.
No. 92, in schedule 2, page 21, leave out lines 25 to 27.
No. 90, in schedule 2, page 21, line 26, leave out ‘the Secretary of State’ and insert ‘Parliament’.
No. 93, in schedule 2, page 21, leave out lines 28 to 31.

Hugo Swire: I will try to speed up on this group of amendments as I suspect that we will not get much agreement from the Minister on any of them. They are designed to flag up our concerns about the financial management of BLF staff. I will go quite quickly, but my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Adam Afriyie), who has a distinguished business career involving hiring and firing and has accumulated mammoth wealth such as the BLF members will be in charge of distributing, may have his own views about the way the board has been set up and its members are being financially rewarded.
We are concerned about the Secretary of State’s ability to become involved in levels of remuneration and compensation. She will be responsible for hiring, firing, paying and compensating them. She will be almighty in these matters. I suspect that the Government will find themselves with a rather compliant board because these people will doubtless want to be hired, remunerated and compensated should it all go horribly wrong. This is really a series of probing amendments.
In amendment No. 91, we suggest leaving out line 22, which is bad news for those who thought that they were going to get rich on the board of the Big Lottery Fund, because we suggest that we do not remunerate any of its members. In that way, we will get people who genuinely want to serve their communities. The Minister keeps referring to the public appointments board and the Nolan rules, but I thought that Nolan was more to do with standards affecting public life than with appointments, although the two no doubt cross over.
In amendment No. 88, we suggest leaving out “Secretary of State” and inserting “Parliament”, because Parliament, not the Secretary of State, should decide on the terms and conditions of employment for the chairman and members. The provision in the Bill is another example of the concentration of power in the hands of the Secretary of State, to which we are philosophically opposed. Amendment No. 89 would also leave out “Secretary of State” and vest power in “Parliament”—that often overlooked body, which is meant to be in charge of matters in this country.
In amendment No. 92, we suggest leaving out lines 25 to 27. The schedule gives the Secretary of State total discretion over BLF board members’ pensions, pay and so on. The Minister prayed in aid the public appointments board and Nolan, so, logically, he would probably agree that such things should be determined by an independent body to avoid any question of the arrangement being too cosy.
For the sake of argument, we have paired amendment No. 92 with amendment No. 90—in fact, we did not pair them, because it is up to you to do so, Mr. Gale. Amendment No. 90 would also leave out “the Secretary of State” and insert “Parliament”, so Parliament would, again, decide who to pay.
Amendment No. 93 would leave out lines 28 to 31, removing the Secretary of State’s right to set compensation for members removed from the BLF board. The schedule is extraordinary. It states:
“If the Secretary of State thinks that there are special circumstances that make it right for a person ceasing to hold office as Chairman or member to receive compensation, the Fund may pay him such compensation as the Secretary of State may determine.”
That is quite extraordinary, because it basically allows the Secretary of State, having received feedback that the chairman is unwilling to pursue the policy that the Secretary of State wants pursued, to say, “Right, we’ve had the feedback, and you’re not performing, so we’re  going to sack you. But don’t worry, because before you go rushing off to the News of the World, The Sun or the Daily Mail, here is your compensation package.” Presumably, that will be paid for out of lottery funds, rather than Government funds—it will perhaps be a little more PFI off-balance-sheet accounting—and the Secretary of State will say, “Don’t worry; we’ll just shift the money around. Here’s a nice little package.” Having received that, no one would, I am sure, go to the News of the World, The Sun or the Daily Mail.
That is completely unacceptable. Why on earth should the Secretary of State have the power in “special circumstances”—those are undefined, but we will no doubt be told that the usual form applies—to compensate someone
“ceasing to hold office as Chairman or member”?
The Bill does not say what the criteria are—perhaps that person will have been asked to stop being a member or the chairman—so things are very open. There is no suggestion as to the amount of compensation, which could be anything from £1 to £100 million, but we will no doubt be told that we are opposing for opposition’s sake and that the Bill reflects the normal way of doing things.
I suggest, however, that a new Bill that so radically changes everything else gives us a good opportunity to say, “Hang on a minute, let’s try to make the legislation better.” After all, that is why we are going through this charade of a Committee, and we hope that the Minister will realise that although we fundamentally disagree with the Bill, we are trying to make it better in the event that we must have it. So let us not always say, “We’ve always done things this way,” because that is not always the best way—not for a progressive Conservative such as I, at any rate.

Charles Walker: My hon. Friend makes an important point. If we set a five-year fixed term, but the Secretary of State decides after one year that a person is not suitable for the job, we could find ourselves having to fork out taxpayers’ or lottery money for the remaining four years of that fixed contract.

Hugo Swire: Indeed, but I strongly suspect that it will not be taxpayers’ money. I am glad that my hon. Friend makes the distinction between lottery money and taxpayers’ money because that is the very line that the Government seek to blur in the Bill. We can be sure that if somebody is deemed not to be performing or not to fit in, for whatever reason, he will be able to be compensated by the Secretary of State for an unspecified reason for an unspecified sum from an unspecified source. That process has no place in legislation. Nobody in the private sector would take on anybody on such terms. We do not know what the Government are proposing to pay the members of the board—no doubt the Minister will say “the usual amount”, whatever that is—but I do know that the clause is very unusual. It is to be resisted, and would certainly not hold water in any private organisation in which I have ever been involved. I doubt that anybody in this Room could agree with it.
The hon. Member for Bath is trying to speed me up. I know that he wants to leap in because he has a lot to say on this group of amendments, which is a mixture of probing amendments about the powers of remuneration and expressions of concern about the ability of the Secretary of State to have hiring, firing and compensating powers with no checks.

Jo Swinson: I am conscious of the time, whether bath time or otherwise. I support many of the sentiments expressed by the hon. Member for East Devon about the general desirability of removing the Secretary of State’s sweeping powers and ensuring that there is more accountability in decision making; for example to Parliament. However, I question whether the amendment would achieve that in the best possible way. Would it not be better to require the Secretary of State to put to Parliament the decisions being made by order, so that there was accountability? Perhaps the Minister could comment on that.
I want to take issue with the suggestion that if we reward board members, we will not get people who are genuinely interested, because such people would do it for no remuneration. I have worries about that, because not everybody is in the fortunate position of the hon. Member for Windsor of being able to give up time to volunteer for a public body without remuneration. There is a growing acceptance that when people give up their time to be councillors or to serve the public in other ways we should recognise that and ensure that they are paid. If we do not, there will be grave consequences for the diversity of the people who can serve on public bodies—not everybody can do so unpaid.
I also feel that there may be better ways to express concern about the overreaching powers of the Secretary of State.

Richard Caborn: All the amendments concern the remuneration of the chairman or other members of the board or a committee of the Big Lottery Fund, as set out in schedule 2. The hon. Member for East Devon is right; the amendments seek to change standard provision for representation on public bodies. Equal provisions apply to the Community Fund and the New Opportunities Fund. Parliament has also approved such provisions for the Olympic distributor and the Horserace Betting and Olympic Lottery Act 2004. I can assure the Committee that the format that we propose in the Bill is tried and trusted. I see no reason why the Big Lottery Fund should be different.
Amendment No. 88 would remove the power of the Secretary of State to determine the remuneration of the chairman or other members of the board or a committee of the Big Lottery Fund, transferring it instead to Parliament. I am sure that, if this set a precedent, Parliament would be delighted to have to determine the pay and remuneration of all such committees. The Secretary of State is normally responsible for approving remuneration. Transferring that responsibility to Parliament seems most unnecessary. Remunerations change only in line with inflation, so there would be little need for the matter to go through Parliament.
Amendments Nos. 89 and 90 are not dissimilar, in that they would remove the Secretary of State’s power to determine travel and other allowances, and pensions, allowances or gratuities to be paid by the fund.

Andrew Turner: I am not sure whether that was another guarantee, promise, offer or aspiration, but the Minister said that the remuneration would change only in line with inflation. Is he saying that at no stage in the lifetime of any of the public bodies set up under the Government has there been any alteration to the terms of remuneration other than changes in line with inflation? Or is he merely making a promise for the future?

Richard Caborn: As to the past, I shall repeat the advice that has been given to me that remuneration changes only in line with inflation, so that there would be little need to discuss that in Parliament. If that is wrong, or if the hon. Gentleman challenges it, I shall check it, or get my officials to check it, and put my findings in writing.

Charles Walker: Will they be full or part-time positions?

Richard Caborn: Part-time.
Amendments Nos. 89 and 90 would give to Parliament the Secretary of State’s power to determine allowances, pensions and gratuities. As with amendment No. 88, it seems unnecessary for Parliament to determine payments such as travel allowances and pensions, as those change only in line with inflation and it would not be a good use of Parliament’s valuable time.
Amendment No. 91 would remove the power to pay remuneration to the chairman or members of the board or a committee. We need the power to pay board members when appropriate. If we assumed that members would be content to serve on the board or committees of the Big Lottery Fund without any possibility of remuneration our ability to recruit high-calibre candidates would be limited. It is important for board members to come from a wide and diverse field, and the amendment would restrict the field of candidates. If the hon. Member for East Devon is what he calls a progressive Conservative he should revisit what he said earlier.
Amendment No. 92 would prevent the fund from paying pensions, allowances or gratuities where appropriate. Not being able to do so would restrict our ability to choose the strongest candidates to serve as board members. For similar reasons we resist amendment No. 93, which, like the other amendments, would change standard provision. We cannot expect the chairman or members to serve on the board without the possibility of compensation should special circumstances require them to cease to hold office.

Hugo Swire: Are those currently serving on the Millennium Commission, the New Opportunities Fund and the Community Fund, whose services will come to an end when the Bill comes into force, still being paid? Will they continue to be paid or will they be compensated for their loss of office?

Richard Caborn: They will not be paid for loss of office. I am the chairman of the Millennium Commission at the moment and I, rightly, do not get one penny piece. To the best of my knowledge, there has been a 50 per cent. reduction in the number serving on the board in the past three months. None of those concerned were compensated, and they would not expect to be.
These are honourable people who want to serve the public. There may be the odd exceptional circumstance, so that different things happen, which is why the reserve powers are necessary. However, hundreds of people serve on the boards in question, giving valuable service to communities around the country and receiving, probably, little by way of expenses or remuneration, which seldom even begins to compensate them. I do not know what expenses are given to the people with whom I have served on the Millennium Commission, but they spend hours travelling the country to ensure that the commission is seen in the best possible light.
It is unthinkable that we should take the action set out in the amendments against such people. Hon. Members who want to pass measures to prevent them receiving a modicum of financial reward should reflect on what kind of people they are. Their attitude is unacceptable to me, but modern Conservatism obviously thinks differently.

Hugo Swire: The word I used was “progressive”. As a progressive Conservative, I acknowledge the work of the people in question, but I also want to protect them and one of my amendments would prevent them being hired and fired by the Secretary of State. The Minister says that the powers are reserve powers, but should not people be better protected? Referring back to an earlier amendment, should not two-thirds of the board decide whether a member is performing, rather than the Secretary of State having reserve powers? What kind of signal does the Minister wish to send?

Richard Caborn: I pray in aid the fact that for eight years, to the best of my knowledge, none of the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman has just described arose in any of the NDPBs that operate on behalf of Government, and I do not believe that they will in future. We are legislating for exceptional circumstances: 99.9 per cent. of such bodies provide a valuable service. There may well be the odd exception, but the vast majority act in the public good. The amendments would change what are clearly standard provisions.

Adam Afriyie: Will the Minister clarify one last point, for my peace of mind? Am I correct in thinking that the Secretary of State could appoint Members of Parliament to the board?

Richard Caborn: No. I apologise if I misled the hon. Gentleman. The constitution of the Millennium Commission was different in that it had Government and Opposition Members and Members of the other place, including Lord Heseltine. Members of Parliament are not eligible to serve on NDPBs.
In the light of what I have said, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press the amendment to a Division.

Hugo Swire: I am happy to accede to the Minister’s wishes in this respect, lest I be reported to somebody and sacked without any right of appeal. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Hugo Swire: I beg to move amendment No. 96, in schedule 2, page 22, leave out lines 9 to 14.

Don Foster: Will the hon. Gentleman give way? [Laughter.]

Hugo Swire: On that point, yes.

Don Foster: The hon. Gentleman said that he might get reported and sacked. I point out that the hon. Member for South-West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous) is not in the Room at present, but he and I had a fairly serious chat before he left.

Hugo Swire: I do not know what to make of that. I hope that no one is hoping to compromise the wheels of the proper democratic process of opposition. If the hon. Gentleman is encouraging brevity, I take his point.
Amendment No. 96 is a probing amendment, which would remove the ability of the BLF to deposit money in an interest-bearing account. What does the proposal actually mean? Does it mean the National Lottery Distribution Fund and if not, why not? The amendment is designed to elicit an explanation from the Minister. If the account referred to is not the National Lottery Distribution Fund—having seen the Minister’s civil servants nod in accord, I have a sneaking feeling about the answer—where do the other distributors keep their balances? What is the fund and where is it? The investment power does not seem to be provided to any of the other distribution bodies established by the previous Acts.

Richard Caborn: The amendment would remove the Big Lottery Fund’s powers to invest money. Paragraph 20 of new schedule 4A to the 1993 Act, which is inserted by schedule 2, allows the funds to invest money in an interest-bearing account. Most of the money that the fund receives will be held in the National Lottery Distribution Fund and invested by the national debt commissioners under section 32 of the 1993 Act. However, non-lottery money received pursuant to the new section 36C of the 1993 Act, which is inserted by clause 14, may be invested under the power in new schedule 4A. The hon. Gentleman has sought elsewhere to limit the BLF’s powers to handle non-lottery funds, but he has not sought to remove those powers entirely. Given that the BLF will have such powers, that makes sense. The BLF is able to invest money received in an interest-bearing account and gain interest on it. I am not sure what advantages there would be in requiring the BLF to keep its funds under the mattress. I hope that, in light of what I have said, the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Hugo Swire: On reflection, Mr. Gale, having heard parts of the Minister’s explanation, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That this schedule be the Second schedule to the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 6.

NOES

Question accordingly disagreed to.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 14 - Functions

Don Foster: I beg to move amendment No. 15, in clause 14, page 7, line 4, at end insert—
‘(1A)The value of loans made under subsection (1) must not exceed the value of grants made under subsection (1).’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 35, in clause 14, page 7, line 4, at end insert—
‘(1A)The total value of loans made in any financial year may not exceed more than one quarter of the total monetary value of both loans and grants combined,’.
No. 36, in clause 14, page 7, leave out lines 7 to 29.
No. 99, in clause 14, page 7, leave out lines 10 to 15.

Don Foster: The Minister read out his brief the last couple of times he spoke, so for the Committee’s amusement, and because it will be quicker, I shall do the same.
The amendments are designed to amend the legislation governing the Big Lottery Fund’s powers to distribute funds. Amendments Nos. 15 and 35 deal with the BLF’s licence to grant loans. Amendments Nos. 36 and 99 are designed to curb the Secretary of State’s powers over the BLF.
One of the national lottery’s founding principles was that it would support good causes through grant funding. As a result, the lottery distributing bodies have developed a wide range of different grants that meet the voluntary and community sector’s diverse needs. In some cases, however, loan finance can play an extremely valuable role as part of a funding mix for some voluntary and community sector organisations. Organisations such as the National Council for Voluntary Organisations have established programmes that use loans to help bodies to become  financially self-sustaining. A loan could help an organisation to set up a trading arm or to purchase a building that they could then hire out. Those initiatives allow voluntary and community organisations to break their dependence on short-term contracts or grants, including grants from the Big Lottery Fund. Those are examples of the way in which lottery funding through loans can sustain the voluntary and community sector. Loans can increase an organisation’s capacity to generate independent income or to obtain more funding.
Although loans can help to promote sustainability among the voluntary and community sector, grants also play a critical role in funding good causes. Grants can be tailored to meet the good causes’ diverse needs and one-off grants can be used to breed innovation. Grants fund projects and organisations that would not secure support from elsewhere. The pressure to repay loans could hamper many organisations’ ability to develop pioneering schemes. The NCVO reports that a general shift towards loans could adversely affect the voluntary and community sector’s income and fundraising activities by forcing it to fundraise in order to repay loans to the BLF. The balance is a difficult one. Loans can be beneficial, but grants, too, are crucial. We must get the balance between the two right. Our probing amendment is designed to ask what proportion of funds will be distributed in loans. Will the Minister confirm that grants will account for for the majority of payments, as our amendment proposes, if not three quarters of all funding, as the Conservative amendment proposes?
The second pair of amendments is concerned, yet again—it does not say yet again in my brief; I admit to adding that, even though the person who wrote the brief might be upset that I have started to busk a bit—with the Secretary of State’s remarkable powers to control the BLF. While the Conservatives have suggested eliminating much of the Secretary of State’s power over the BLF, the Liberal Democrats are particularly opposed to the Secretary of State retaining the power to specify the maximum and minimum amount that may be distributed
“during a specified period for expenditure of a description prescribed under section 23(3A)”.
It is most important that the BLF should retain the right to set its own maximum and minimum amounts and that the Secretary of State should not encroach too far on the distribution of funds. I hope that those comments have been for the edification of you, Mr. Gale, and the entire Committee.

Hugo Swire: I am more than happy to support the hon. Member for Bath in his amendments, but I rise to speak to the official Opposition amendments in the group. We have several concerns about the ability of the Big Lottery Fund to make loans, two of which I shall address. First, we are concerned that loans could be used as a way to bring down balances in an emergency, as it is much quicker to make a loan than to go through the process of making a grant. Secondly, is it envisaged that the same criteria will be applied to  the granting of a loan as to the making of a grant? Both those points deserve clarification, and I would welcome a response to them.
On the first two amendments in the group, neither ours nor that of the Liberal Democrats would rule out the BLF being able to make loans; we merely suggest that there should be a limit on the value of those loans. Such a cap would ensure that the BLF retains its primary role as a distributor of lottery grants, rather than becomes a banker of lottery loans. Loans can be an important part of the funding mix for voluntary and community organisations, but my main concern is that lottery distributors should remain grant makers, for that is the basis on which the good causes have operated so effectively for the past 11 years.
I am sure that the Minister will reassure us that it is not intended that the Big Lottery Fund should make loans of greater value than our or the Liberal Democrats’ amendments would allow, and that the amendments are therefore unnecessary. I hope that he will assure me that the BLF’s power to make loans will not be used as a vehicle for Government funds. I refer here to our other proposed amendments to clause 14 regarding the BLF’s use of non-lottery funds, so you will be glad to know, Mr. Gale, that I will not raise that matter again. I am merely concerned as to whether it is intended that the BLF should make loans out of non-lottery or lottery funds, and whether the powers might be used to make the BLF more than a distributor of lottery money.
I am also keen to hear whether and, if he does, why the Minister disagrees with proposed amendments Nos. 36 and 99, which would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to micro-manage the Big Lottery Fund. The Minister has been assiduous in pointing out the fallacy of Opposition amendments that would, to his way of thinking, involve the micro-management of the whole national lottery enterprise by bringing various matters to Parliament, which he says would be ridiculous. The Opposition now wish to remove the Secretary of State’s ability to micro-manage the Big Lottery Fund, so logically—if there is any logic to the Minister’s thinking on this matter—he should support those amendments.
The Bill allows the Secretary of State to specify individual amounts for prescribed grants. That sort of micro-management is incompatible with the ability of the Big Lottery Fund to operate effectively as a distributor of hundreds of millions of pounds a year. We are not making a political point about the Secretary of State’s power but an operational one about the Big Lottery Fund, and the Minister will no doubt wish to respond to it.
Interestingly, given our discussions on earlier amendments, I note that proposed new section 36B(4)(c) to the 1993 Act, on the power to distribute funds, gives the Secretary of State the power to
“make provision by reference to the aggregate of amounts distributed, to a percentage of amounts available for distribution or otherwise”.
Does that mean that the Secretary of State could, with a wave of her hand, ensure that that 60 per cent. or 70 per cent. of the Big Lottery Fund goes to charities?

Richard Caborn: The amendments relate to the Big Lottery Fund’s functions as set out in proposed new section 36B to the 1993 Act. Amendments Nos. 15 and 35 would limit the value of the loans made by the Big Lottery Fund and amendment No. 15 provides that the value of the loans made by the fund should not exceed the value of the grants. Amendment No. 35 provides that the total value of the loans made in a financial year should not exceed one quarter of the total monetary value of loans and grants combined.
New section 36B sets out the Big Lottery Fund’s main power to distribute funds. The funds will be used to make grants, loans, or other distribution arrangements. We think that it would be useful if the fund had the flexibility to provide funds in different ways to respond to different needs and different circumstances. Parliament gave similar powers to the Olympic lottery distributors in the Horse Racing Betting and Olympics Lottery Act 2004. We do not expect loan making to be a major function of the Big Lottery Fund; we certainly do not intend to turn it from a grant-making body to a loan company. That is clear from the range and nature of grant-making programmes that have already been announced. The circumstances in which the fund may lend money and the conditions that it will be required to observe will be included in the financial directions; that is the case with all non-departmental public bodies, including lottery distributors. No one wants to turn the Big Lottery Fund into a big loans company. For those reasons, we are not convinced of the need to provide restrictions in the Bill. I hope that the amendments will not be pressed.
Amendments Nos. 36 and 39 focus on the Secretary of State’s order-making powers under proposed new section 36B(3). That power allows my right hon. Friend to limit the amount or proportion of money that the Big Lottery Fund may spend on different types of prescribed expenditure. Amendment No. 99 would remove the Secretary of State’s powers to specify maximum and minimum amounts and amendment No. 36 would remove the Secretary of State’s order-making powers altogether.
I shall explain why those order-making powers are necessary. As I said in relation to clause 7, the new good cause provision is extremely broad. We need to be able to set out at the highest level the types of expenditure on which the Big Lottery Fund should focus, and clause 7 allows us to do that. The order-making powers in clause 14, which would in practice be exercised at the same time as the powers in clause 7, allow us to limit the amount or proportion of that money that the Big Lottery Fund may distribute on the different types of prescribed expenditure. Without that power, the fund could in theory spend all its money on one type of prescribed expenditure—for example, on transformational grants. The Secretary of State plans to use the power to specify the amount or proportion of the money that the fund should spend on transformational grants and the awards for all  programme. We do not intend to specify the amount or proportion of money in relation to the three main funding themes.
We recently consulted publicly on an interim order for the New Opportunities Fund; the order is as far as is possible under the existing legislative framework the same as the one that we propose to issue in due course for the Big Lottery Fund. In the 15 responses we received there was no substantive comment from consultees on the draft order, which suggests no great concern about the order-making powers. We have also made available to the Committee an illustrative order using the powers set out in the Bill, which I thought would provide further reassurance about how we intend to exercise these powers. In light of what I have said, I hope that hon. Members will withdraw their amendments.

Don Foster: I will confess at the beginning of my remarks that I am going to do as the Minister says and beg leave to withdraw. Notwithstanding his joke and his assurance that it is not anyone’s intention to create “Loans R Us” and that loan making is not to be a major function of the Big Lottery Fund, the Committee would have found it helpful had he given some ballpark indication of the split between loan making and grant giving, at least so that we could get a feel for the Government’s position. It is slightly odd that he is not prepared to do that while resisting amendments that would remove the right of the Secretary of State to specify in detail how different parts of the BLF money is to be spent. On the one hand, he is asking us to allow the Secretary of State to have powers to micro-manage and to specify precisely how the money will be distributed; on the other hand, he is not prepared to give any indication of the sort of split that there might be. I say to the Minister that perhaps he has not treated the amendments with the respect that they deserve.
I end by saying to the right hon. Gentleman, in the kindest and most gentle way possible, that he seems to want to have his cake and eat it. One minute he is telling us that it is disgraceful for the Opposition parties want to write in the Bill that 60 per cent. to 70 per cent. of the money should be spent in a particular area—in this case, on voluntary community activities—despite the assurances that everyone under the sun has given; the next minute, he wants us blithely to accept that at some later date, via an order to be laid at a later stage, the Secretary of State will be able to do all of that. He will not accept the will of the Committee and perhaps of the House to specify that 60 per cent. to 70 per cent. proportion.
There are many inconsistencies in what we are hearing today and we will want to explore them in more detail, perhaps in another form at a later stage. I am disappointed with the Minister’s response, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Roger Gale: I do not know how long the Committee wishes to sit for. I am prepared to sit until 7 o’clock on this occasion. If we are likely to go on much longer I shall suspend for an hour and a half so  that members may make themselves comfortable, but I am at the Committee’s disposal and prepared to come back.

Hugo Swire: I beg to move amendment No. 41, in clause 14, page 7, line 31, at beginning insert
‘Provided the annual value of money either paid to the Fund or distributed to a third party exceeds no more than one quarter of the annual amount of money donated by the Fund,’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 39, in clause 14, page 7, line 35, leave out from ‘party’ to end of line 37.
No. 40, in clause 14, page 7, line 37, at end insert—
‘(2A)An arrangement under subsection (1) may not limit the Fund’s freedom of action in relation to the distribution of the money paid under the arrangement.’.

Hugo Swire: Mr Gale, you were right to prevent me from speaking again after the hon. Member for Bath sat down and not to allow me to register my disappointment that the Minister had not addressed the two questions about balances that I had asked.
Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 would remove the ability of the person contributing non-lottery funds to the Big Lottery Fund to control what happens to the money. The amendments relate somewhat to the previous discussion and touch again on the financial operations of the Big Lottery Fund. I want to hear from the Minister how he envisages the Big Lottery Fund will be able to distribute non-lottery funds in practice. I admit to what I have been accused of earlier, which is a degree of scepticism, but my fear is that the Big Lottery Fund will become a conduit for Government or taxpayers’ money and the lines will become so blurred that no one will be able to distinguish which is which. It will become a brand through which the Government can channel money in any school dinner-type emergency, as they so enjoy doing.
Amendment No. 41 therefore proposes a reasonable limit on the amount of non-lottery funds that the BLF can handle. It is designed to ensure that the lines do not become blurred. Amendments No. 39 and 40 would remove the ability of the person who gives the Big Lottery Fund non-lottery funds to influence where the money may go. The Bill states that that person may
“limit the Fund’s freedom of action in relation to the distribution of the money paid under the arrangement.”
That impacts on the operational freedom of the Big Lottery Fund. The provision is akin to someone giving money to a charity and saying that they only want it to spend it on this project or that good cause, or even to a taxpayer giving his taxes to the Chancellor and saying, “Don’t spend this on the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.”—perish the thought. We know the Treasury’s view on those who advocate hypothecation in general taxation terms. We feel strongly that if the Big Lottery Fund is to handle this money, those who provide it will have undue influence on its eventual destination.

Richard Caborn: The amendments would limit the arrangements under new section 36C of the 1993 Act for the Big Lottery Fund to work as an agent  distributing money for other public bodies, the Government or private foundations. The suggestion for that provision came from the fund and it has been approached in the past to use the system to get things going quickly. As I explained when we discussed amendment No. 27, it does not have the power to distribute other people’s money, whether that is public or private charity money.
Amendment No. 41 would restrict the proportion of non-lottery business for the Big Lottery Fund to a quarter of total grant payments, while amendments Nos. 39 and 40 would prevent the persons providing non-lottery money from putting limits on the Big Lottery Fund’s freedom of action in distributing it. The new powers should not, in our view, be constrained in such a way. It would limit the potential to streamline and simplify a range of funding and limit further developments of specialism, skills and knowledge, as well as the potential reduction in the cost of distribution and grant management through economies of scale.
We do not expect the distribution of non-lottery funds to become a major part of the fund, so I am not saying that we wish to ensure that more than 25 per cent. of their business can be non-lottery. No one wants the fund to be distracted from its main lottery function, but there is a danger that amendment No. 41 would set limits that prevented good opportunities from being exploited. The fund must have the flexibility to get involved where it thinks that it can add value.

Adam Afriyie: Through the history of such funds under the 1993 Act, has there been an example where more than 25 per cent. of that funding was spent in one location?

Richard Caborn: I would not have thought so, although I cannot say it categorically. I will ask my officials to look at that and will write to the hon. Gentleman.
As I was saying, amendments Nos. 39 and 40 give me the opportunity to assure the Committee that the arrangements are the minimum necessary. If the fund takes on the job of distributing someone else’s money—money from a health promotion charity, for example—funding partners will expect some say in how it is spent. The arrangements cannot be forced on the fund, so if funding partners expect too much there will be no arrangements at all. If the amendments were pressed, the funder would be forbidden any say at all. Obviously no one will hand over money to distributors on that basis. Basically that would end the new section 36C before it had even started.

Adam Afriyie: Would the Minister entertain the idea that it was specific and made reference to the fact that the Government could not ask a distributor to place funds in a certain direction, rather than just generally any third party?

Richard Caborn: We would fall under the same rules. It is not the Government who are doing this; the BLF is coming to us asking for flexibility. It has been approached by funding partners who believe that they could add value to the lottery funds through this type of arrangement. There is an economy of scale, and it is a sensible approach. I understand the concerns, and we will be watching very carefully. In the spirit of co-operation we are prepared to allow this, but we do not want it to be overly influenced, with people who bring money to the fund determining where the lottery money should go. A balance has to be struck, but equally, we will be sensible and allow the people who are coming on to these boards to have the power to add value.

Hugo Swire: Seeing as the Opposition are at a disadvantage and are not privy to the conversations that the BLF is having with these other potential funders, will the Minister give the Committee an example of the sort of people who are coming to the BLF and the sort of projects they are seeking to do jointly?

Richard Caborn: I will seek to speak to the BLF about that and get one or two examples of where it believes that type of partnership could work. We see what is happening in our constituencies where we are bringing schemes together with lottery funding, and I welcome that. I know that we will have a debate later about additionality, but sometimes we are so silent in this area that opportunities are missed to bring various funding schemes, including charitable funds, together. There are a number of areas where charitable funding could sit alongside the BLF and add value without distracting from its core purpose.

Don Foster: The Minister could pray in aid the Arts Council. It is a good example of a body that deals with funds from the lottery and another source—grant in aid from the Government. It is finding an effective way of adding value. There are some good examples around already.
Adam Afriyierose—

Richard Caborn: I give way to the hon. Member for Windsor.

Adam Afriyie: I am still marginally alarmed by this. The general concern is about the Government’s ability to direct the flow of funding, especially from the BLF. While other third parties may come in and place criteria on how that funding is matched, surely there must be some understanding of the concern that the Government should not be excluded from the list of funders who can ask that their money be earmarked for a particular project.

Richard Caborn: That would be a judgment for the BLF. Again, this is not something that the Government necessarily want. The BLF has come to us to say that there are opportunities here. If it wanted to add to public funding and it believed that would add value, that would be permissible too. But it is a decision for the BLF, not the Government. Given the assurances  that I have offered, the amendment should be withdrawn, and the BLF should be allowed to continue adding value to its work.

Hugo Swire: I am not necessarily reassured by the Minister’s response. The Big Lottery Fund wishes to act as independently as it can, so I should have thought that it would say to the Minister, “Look at the amendments. They give us more protection from undue interference from other Government funding sources or the private sector.” That is all that we seek to achieve, and I am sorry if the Minister thinks that we are attempting to tie the hands of the BLF board or constrain it in any way—our amendments would do the reverse. Nevertheless, I shall not press the amendment to a vote, as we and others can return to the issue later, and we must leave some meat for the wolves. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment by leave withdrawn.

Hugo Swire: I beg to move amendment No. 43, in clause 14, page 8, line 8, leave out
‘under any provision of this Act’
and insert
‘by the Big Lottery Fund’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 44, in clause 14, page 8, line 10, leave out
‘under any provision of this Act’
and insert
‘by the Big Lottery Fund’.
No. 45, in clause 14, page 8, line 11, leave out
‘under any provision of this Act’
and insert
‘by the Big Lottery Fund’.

Hugo Swire: The amendments are very straightforward. They confine the scope of the BLF’s ability to give advice to other lottery distributors to matters that relate to its own funding or operations. They would allow it, for example, to advise the Arts Council on any project on which the two bodies were joint distributors—we have heard from the hon. Member for Bath that the Arts Council is an organisation that has joint funding arrangements in place—but not on any other project.
One of the fears of other lottery distributors is that the Big Lottery Fund is or will be—depending on whether we think that it is set up, or is some sort of shadow administration—too big. I am not clear why it should be able to give advice to other lottery distributors whereas others, seemingly, cannot give advice back to it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments.

Don Foster: I raised this point earlier in relation to the national lottery funding decision document of July 2003. I selected from that document four activities that it suggested might be the responsibility of the Big Lottery Fund. The Minister confirmed that the four that I read out are all covered by the clause that we are now debating. On the assumption that the Minister is correct—I take him at his word—what assessment has  been made of the cost that the BLF will incur in undertaking those additional activities? What impact will that have on the Government’s estimate that appears in the explanatory notes and various other documents of the sum that will accrue as a result of the economies of scale that will come from the merger of the New Opportunities Fund and the Community Fund? My point is simple: I am not convinced that, in assessing the financial benefits of economy of scale, account has been taken of the additional responsibilities that will be undertaken by the Big Lottery Fund.

Richard Caborn: I remind the hon. Gentleman that the Millennium Commission will also be feeding into the process, bringing a lot of expertise. Our 2003 national lottery funding decision document, as the hon. Member for Bath says, set out a number of areas of joint working between lottery distributors in which it was appropriate for the Big Lottery Fund to take the lead. That included handling cross-cutting issues. New section 36D will allow the Big Lottery Fund to take the role of lead distributor by allowing it to give advice beyond its own functions. For example, potential applicants are not always sure to which distributor or programme they should apply. Many of us have found that to be the case in our constituencies. The Bill will allow the BLF to take the lead in providing a single point of advice for new applicants who are unsure where they should seek advice or guidance or to which distributor they should apply. We hope that this is more user-friendly and that it will be easier for people to apply for lottery money, thereby ensuring that it goes to good cause projects more quickly.
The Big Lottery Fund will be able to take a lead in developing common standards such as applications and complaints procedures. It will reduce administrative costs for all lottery distributors and ensure that more money goes to good causes. It will be able to share best practice, particularly as the successor to the Millennium Commission, to which I referred earlier, and to become a centre of excellence, advice and expertise for the management of major capital projects, for which there is great capacity. We want to encourage innovative advice on the best management of projects, particularly capital projects. Although distributors can and do work well together, someone needs to take a lead as a centre of excellence, and we believe that the Big Lottery Fund is best placed to do so.
The amendments would prevent the Big Lottery Fund from taking such a leading role by limiting its power to giving advice to its own functions, a role that it will have in any case.

Don Foster: The Minister has not answered my question, which is simply this: what is the estimated cost of the provision of these additional services? While the Minister seeks inspiration for an answer, I remind him that the Culture, Media and Sport Committee report on reforming the national lottery, which the Committee produced in the 2003–04 session, said:
“We agree that the extra services provided under the merged body will enhance the distribution process but very much hope the cost of these will not erode the grants given by the new body.”
It therefore assumed that there was an additional cost. I assume that there is an additional cost, and I believe that the Committee wants to know the Government’s estimate of that cost and how it will be offset against the savings from economies of scale achieved through the merger.

Richard Caborn: I do not know the estimated costs. We expect savings to be made in the merger, but that is not the hon. Gentleman’s point. He is talking about the cost of the service that is actually being delivered, even though savings might be made by merging the three bodies. That is fine, but the hon. Gentleman is asking what is the cost of providing that one-stop shop for advice. I cannot answer that question, but I shall ask my officials to look into the matter.
All I can say is that we found a great deal of expertise at the Millennium Commission when we were considering its reorganisation, and we believed that that expertise could rightfully be used among lottery distributors. That is why we moved them quite early on to the shadow board of the Big Lottery Fund, which is working quite well.
I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying. As I said, I cannot answer his question now, but I shall ask my officials to come back with estimates of the cost of the one-stop shop and of keeping the advice inside the organisation.

Hugo Swire: I am sorry that once again the Minister did not address my point. From what he is saying, it sounds as though the Big Lottery Fund can act like Big Brother and intimidate other lottery distributors by its very size. Perhaps that is what is intended, if one subscribes to the view that this is phase 1 of the Big Lottery Fund becoming the sole distributor. That, however, is not a debate for this afternoon.

Richard Caborn: For the record, my Secretary of State has given a very clear assurance that the three funding boards—for heritage, arts and sport—will be included alongside the Big Lottery Fund up to and beyond the implementation of the new licence. I reiterate that clear statement, which was made during Question Time earlier this week.

Hugo Swire: I am glad to hear that again, because the heritage sector has been extremely nervous about the situation beyond 2009.
Given the time and the Minister’s thoughts on the intentions behind the amendments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Further consideration adjourned.—[Claire Ward.]

Committee adjourned at Seven o’clock till Thursday 27 October at half-past Nine o’clock.